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ABSTRACT
Canada’s linkage regime for pharmaceuticals, modeled after the
originating U.S. Hatch-Waxman regime, was brought in under intense
political pressure to balance effective patent enforcement over new and
innovative drugs with the timely market entry of lower-priced generic
competitors. It has been almost two decades since the regulations were
enacted, and to date, there has been little objective assessment as to
whether the regulations have, in fact, stimulated innovation and timely
generic entry. We recently completed three empirical studies on the
linkage between drug approval and drug patenting under the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations (NOC Regulations). Of
particular interest was the nexus between the innovative character of
new and follow-on drugs approved by Canadian regulators and the
scope of intellectual property protection afforded to these drugs via
operation of linkage regulations. The first study focused on the type of
brand-name and generic drug approvals over an eight-year term
following the coming into force of the linkage regime and leading up to
the debate on progressive licensing of drug products. The second was
an analysis of patenting characteristics for therapeutic products before
and after the coming into force of the NOC Regulations. That study
also involved a detailed analysis of patent and therapeutic classes in
which multinational drug companies are focusing their attention and
how these can be used to support various types of new and follow-on
drug development. The third was a more nuanced analysis of the
innovative nature of new and follow-on drugs approved by regulators
over this time frame coupled with an investigation into how patent
monopoly periods for pharmaceuticals were extended via the linkage
regulations. The implications of the data for the vires of pharmaceutical
linkage are discussed in light of the stated goals of government to
stimulate new and innovative drug development and facilitate timely
entry of generic products and, thus, to balance the goals and objectives
of food and drug law with those of enabling patent legislation. The
Article finishes with a brief description of the global evolution of
pharmaceutical linkage and raises issues for further research into local
and global systems of pharmaceutical law and policy.
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INTRODUCTION
The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations (NOC
1
Regulations) came into force in 1993 as part of Canada’s perceived
obligations under TRIPS and NAFTA to support the domestic
2
pharmaceutical industry. The original policy intent of the regulations,
as outlined in successive government Regulatory Impact Analysis
Statements (RIAS), was to encourage the development of new and
innovative drugs and facilitate the timely market entry of generic drugs,
and thus, to balance the goals and objectives of food and drug law with
those of patent law. Prior to the linkage regime coming into force, drug
regulation and drug patenting represented distinct goals and policy
3
objectives. This balancing exercise is a familiar one to the intellectual
property bar owing to the quid pro quo of the traditional patent bargain.
Thus, under the terms of the linkage regime, there must be a specific
functional legal nexus between approved drugs and patent protection
for those drugs pursuant to the NOC Regulations.
4
As appreciated in the early literature on topic, it was not output
metrics but a combination of lobbying by the U.S. pharmaceutical
industry, its hopeful domestic university funding partners, and a federal
government bent on harmonizing the Canadian system of intellectual
1. Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/1993-133. (Can).
[hereinafter Patented Medicines Regulations].
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, T.S. No. 2
(1994), 32 I.L.M. 289 (between the Governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States;
entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA]; Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPS) 1994, Oct. 30, 1947, T.S. No. 27 (1947), 58 U.N.T.S. 187 (negotiated as part
of the Uruguay Round (1986–1994) of the World Trade Organization’s General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) [hereinafter TRIPS]).
3. AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560
(Can.). The Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged that until 1993, the two regulatory
systems for drug approval and drug patenting were largely “kept distinct and separate.” Id. at
¶ 12. Indeed, as late as 2003, Robert Peterson, Director General of the Therapeutics Product
Directorate of Health Canada, stated before the Standing Committee on Industry, Science
and Technology that the purpose of the drug submission structure was “to support drug
review. It was not designed with the aim of safeguarding intellectual property rights.”
Michael C. Jordan, The Politics of Drug Patenting in Canada 102 (Aug. 2005) (unpublished
M.A. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan) (on file with the University of Saskatchewan,
Electronic Thesis 7 Dissertation Project). Regarding confusion over the precise nature of the
approval-patenting nexus, Dr. Peterson stipulated “this in our view is one reason why the
linkage aspects of the patented medicines NOC regulations are so hard to grapple with . . . .”
Id. For a detailed discussion of the political climate leading up the NOC Regulations, see id.
4. See generally Robert Tancer, Foreign Investment in North America and the
Pharmaceutical Industry in Canada, THE INT’L EXEC., Mar./Apr. 1997, at 283; Christopher
Scott Harrison, Protection of Pharmaceuticals as Foreign Policy: The Canada-U.S. Trade
Agreement and Bill C-22 Versus the North American Free Trade Agreement and Bill C-91, 26
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 457, 460 (2000–2001) [hereinafter Harrison].
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property with that of the United States that led to enactment of the
NOC Regulations. Once the domestic U.S. policy environment was
recalibrated away from nascent support for a Canadian-based system of
price controls and towards preventing nations such as Canada from
having systems of intellectual property law that were perceived to be
5
based on “rights piracy,” stronger patent protection in Canada was
6
inevitable. However, with one notable exception, few independent
observers would have guessed during the debate on patent reform that
the linkage regime would potentially tip so far to the rights-protection
end of the spectrum. It has now been almost two decades since the
regulations were enacted subsequent to Canada’s perceived obligations
under NAFTA and TRIPS. Given the continuing public debate over
7
high drug prices, the large fraction of research and development carried
out by publicly-funded institutions that is ultimately enveloped within
8
commercialized products, and wide criticism of the failings of the patent
5. This position was strongly advocated by numerous Canadian politicians, particularly
those in the governing Conservative Party. See generally Harrison, supra note 4, at 462–64;
JORDAN, supra note 3; Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on
Bill C-91, 34:7 Parliament of Canada 7:65–96 (Dec. 1, 1992). For example, Harvie Andre,
Minister for Consumer and Corporate Affairs under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney referred
to the 1969 bill authorizing compulsory licensing as “legalized theft” and that repeal of the
same will indicate that Canada would not be “taking a free ride at the expense of the rest of
the world.” Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, apparently bowing to pressure from President
Reagan at the time NAFTA was being negotiated, stated that the nation had acted “as a
scavenger in the area of intellectual property.” See e.g., Harrison, supra note 4, at 513; Alan
Story, Drug Wars: Does Anyone Really Know the Price Tag?, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 20, 1986,
B1; MARCI MCDONALD, YANKEE DOODLE DANDY: BRIAN MULRONEY AND THE
AMERICAN AGENDA 211 (1995).
6. Dr. Stephen Schondelmeyer, a pharmacologist and health economist, gave evidence
before the House of Commons to the effect that it is not the term of single patents that
mattered most, but rather how patents add cumulatively to extend market exclusivity, a claim
the government at the time vigorously denied. See infra Section IV.B. Compare Minutes of
Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 34:7 Parliament of
Canada, 7:65–96 (Dec. 1, 1992) and Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative
Committee on Bill C-91, 34:8 Parliament of Canada, 8:37–40 (Dec. 1, 1992) (testimony of Dr.
Stephen Schondelmeyer (Professor, University of Minnesota) and Dr. Elizabeth Dickson
(Director General, Department of Industry, Science and Technology)).
7. See generally PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA’S HEALTH: THE FDA,
BUSINESS, AND ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION (2003); JERRY AVORN,
POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
(2004); MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY
DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004); JAY S. COHEN, OVERDOSE: THE CASE
AGAINST THE DRUG COMPANIES (2001).
8. See generally SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST: HAS THE
LURE OF PROFITS CORRUPTED BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH? (2003); Ron A. Bouchard,
Balancing Public and Private Interests in the Commercialization of Publicly Funded Medical
Research: Is There a Role for Compulsory Government Royalty Fees?, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH.
L. 120, 158–64 (2007); Ron A. Bouchard & Trudo Lemmens, Commentary, Privatizing
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9

system to promote innovation, it is an excellent time to assess whether
the NOC Regulations have satisfied the twin policy goals of encouraging
new and innovative drug development and the timely market entry of
generic drugs. We have chosen as the vehicle of our investigation, the
growing field of empirical legal research.
The empirical work reviewed and discussed here was designed to
investigate whether and how the NOC Regulations have encouraged the
development of new and innovative drugs since being enacted. The
importance of empirical studies to assessing the efficiency and
effectiveness of policy levers such as intellectual property law and
regulations cannot be overstated. As noted by some of the most
prominent economists, innovation scholars, and patent scholars over the
10
last decades, robust conclusions regarding the consequences for

Biomedical Research—a ‘Third Way’, 26 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 31 (2008).
9. MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY
192–96 (2008) (finding only “weak or no evidence” that IP protection increases innovation);
KRIMSKY, supra note 8.
10. Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and the
Innovation Process, 29 RES. POL’Y 531 (2000). Jaffe notes that it is possible that the R&D
boom in the late 1970s and early 1980s would not have been so large or lasted so long without
enhanced IP rights, and that “[i]t is disquieting, however, that there is so little empirical
evidence that what is widely perceived to be a significant strengthening of intellectual
property protection had significant impact on the innovation process.” Id. at 540. Jaffe
further observes that “[o]verall, there is a noticeable gap between the highly developed
theoretical literature on patent scope and the limited empirical literature.” Id. at 548. This is
due partially to the infrequency of changes in patent regimes like the one examined by
Sakakibara and Branstetter. Id. at 546. “Part of the difficulty also lies in the weakness of the
connection between the model constructs and quantifiable aspects of a patent regime.” Id. at
548. Finally, Jaffe comments, “[t]his limited success is due partially to the difficulty of
measuring the parameters of patent policy, and partly due to the difficulty of discerning
statistically significant effects when many things have been changing at the same time. But it
should surely be viewed as a challenge to researchers to try to do more.” Id. at 554. See also
Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong Patent Protection:
A Contribution to the Current Debate, 27 RES. POL’Y 273, 280 (1998):
The range of arguments about the positive social value of patents is obviously much
wider than the area that strong empirical studies explored to date. An analyst, citing
the earlier empirical studies that appear to have shown only limited social value,
obviously is vulnerable to the argument that those studies do not provide evidence
on some of the possibly most important functions patents serve. . . . We cannot
present here an empirically supported and intellectually persuasive argument on this
broad question. The important empirical research that needs to be done in order to
map out the basic facts simply has not been done yet . . . .
Id. at 280. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 9, at 192. In a meta-analysis of empirical studies
of whether introducing or strengthening patent protection leads to greater innovation,
Boldrin and Levine note, “[w]e have identified twenty-three economic studies that have
examined this issue empirically. . . . The executive summary: these studies find weak or no
evidence that strengthening patent regimes increases innovation; they find evidence that
strengthening the patent regime increases . . . patenting!” Id.
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technological innovation of changes in patent law and policy are few
and far between. This is due primarily to a fundamental lack of relevant
empirical data. The same applies in the reverse, as governments have
specific legal and policy goals in mind when drafting law and
regulations, which are then reviewable by the courts in judicial review
proceedings.
We have recently published three studies that provide empirical data
for analysis of whether pharmaceutical linkage regulations, in operation,
are consistent with the intent of balancing the goals of patent law with
those of food and drug law, while stimulating new and innovative drug
development. The data are relevant to all jurisdictions that have, or are
currently contemplating bringing in, some form of linkage. The first
study focused on the types of new and follow-on drugs approved by
11
Canadian regulators between 2001 and 2008. The year 2001 was chosen
as our starting point, as this was the date when substantial amendments to
Canadian drug regulation were made that affected both the mechanisms
12
and speed of approval. The second study focused on patenting patterns
13
associated with drugs identified in the first study. We analyzed the
number of patents per drug, the number of patents listed on the patent
register, and the timing of these metrics to one another and the date of
drug approval. We conducted tests on the statistical nature of the trends
in patenting before and after the NOC Regulations came into force. In
addition, we analyzed patents and approved drugs in terms of the World
Health Organization (WHO) Anatomic Therapeutic Class in order to
identify therapeutic areas (cardiovascular, cancer, etc.) in which forms are
focusing their drug development activities. Finally, we developed an
independent patent classification scheme to analyze the type (chemical,
use, combination, etc.) of patents associated with approved drugs. The
third study focused on the legal nexus between drug approval and drug
14
patenting in a subgroup of the most profitable drugs sold in Canada.
Our aim was to quantify patenting, patent listing, and patent litigation
patterns associated with these drugs under the NOC Regulations and to
investigate the manner in which patent terms on already approved
11. Monika Sawicka & Ron A. Bouchard, Empirical Analysis of Canadian Drug
Approval Data 2001–2008: Are Pharmaceutical Players “Doing More With Less”?, 3 MCGILL
J.L. & HEALTH 85 (2009).
12. Id. at 107.
13. Ron A. Bouchard, Richard W. Hawkins, Robert Clark, Ray Hagtvedt, & Jamil
Sawani, Empirical Analysis of Drug Approval–Drug Patenting Linkage for High Value
Pharmaceuticals, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INT. PROP. 174 (2010) [hereinafter Bouchard 2010].
14. Ron A. Bouchard, Jamil Sawani, Chris McLelland, Monika Sawicka & Richard W.
Hawkins. The Pas de Deux of Pharmaceutical Regulation and Innovation: Who’s Leading
Whom?, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1461, 1463 n.2 (2009) [hereinafter Bouchard 2009].
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blockbuster drugs were extended via operation of the linkage regime.
The purpose of the present Article is to review data from these studies
and to analyze them in light of the stated objectives of the NOC
Regulations as well as relevant Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence
and principles of statutory interpretation.
I. REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES
A. Study 1*
15

Our first study (“Study 1”) was an analysis of drug approvals,
referred to in Canada as Notices of Compliance (NOCs), issued over the
period from 2001 to 2008. Our goal was to develop an independent
empirical methodology and synthetic model to investigate what types of
drug candidates were approved by Canadian regulators over nearly a
decade and to investigate which type of drugs might qualify for flexible
16
departure under emerging lifecycle-based drug regulatory models. A
related goal was to use this model to identify patterns in the rate (how
much) and direction (what kind) of innovative activity by domestic
brand name and generic pharmaceutical firms. One methodological
tool employed by our group was construction of “patent trees.” Patent
trees were used to assess the number, type, and timing of patents
granted in relation to a specific drug or a group of related follow-on
drugs, and these patent trees could be assessed and visualized. An
example of such an analysis is provided in Fig. 1.

* For the full study, please refer to Monika Sawicka & Ron A. Bouchard, Empirical Analysis
of Canadian Drug Approval Data 2001–2008: Are Pharmaceutical Players “Doing More With
Less”?, 3 MCGILL J.L. & HEALTH 85 (2009).
15. See generally Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 11.
16. This is referred to in Canadian pharmaceutical policy as “progressive licensing.”
See generally HEALTH PRODUCTS AND FOOD BRANCH, BLUEPRINT FOR RENEWAL:
TRANSFORMING CANADA’S APPROACH TO REGULATING HEALTH PRODUCTS AND FOOD,
33 (2006), http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/alt_formats/hpfb-dgpsa/pdf/hpfb-dgpsa/blueprintplan-eng.pdf [hereinafter HEALTH CANADA, BLUEPRINT]. See also Progressive Licensing
Project, Health Canada, The Progressive Licensing Framework Concept Paper for Discussion
(2006),
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfbdgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/proglic_homprog_concept-eng.pdf [hereinafter HEALTH CANADA,
PLF CONCEPT PAPER]; Neil Yeates et al., Health Canada’s Progressive Licensing Framework,
176 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1845, 1845 (2007).
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Fig 1. Example of Search String and Patent Tree Analysis for Advair Diskus®. Patents were
identified using the specific and general search strings described in the Methods. In addition to
quantifying patents per drug, this method also allows assessment of how specific drugs evolve into
related drug forms or (in this case) drug products representing combinations of known drugs. In
addition, the patent tree analysis allows for identification of relevant patent types based on the
classification nomenclature described in the Methods. Finally, the patent tree analysis provides
data relating to drug development, but also on the type of patents selected by pharmaceutical
companies for listing on the patent register in order to prevent generics. Reproduced courtesy of
the Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property.©

We analyzed 3,837 drug approvals over the period from 2001 to
2008, with a particular focus on the types of new and follow-on drugs
being approved and the manner in which approvals were consistent with
17
emerging lifecycle models of drug regulation. Of the cohort of 3,837
approvals, 45% were administrative in nature (product manufacturer or
name change), leaving 2,122 approvals for detailed analysis. There were
two related components of the work that were published in separate
articles. The first focused on approval statistics, whereas the second
focused on the innovative character of approved drugs.
Data from the first component demonstrated that the percentage of
new drugs developed over the test period decreased substantially
whereas the number and fraction of follow-on drug increased. All three
groups in the “new drug” category investigated experienced a decrease
over time. This included new drug submissions (NDSs) generally, and
NDS submissions containing a new active substance (NAS) and those
directed to First in Class drugs.
By contrast, all four categories of “follow-on” drugs increased over
17. Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 11, at 104. See also Hans-Georg Eichler et al.,
Opinion, Balancing Early Market Access to New Drugs with the Need for Benefit/Risk Data: A
Mounting Dilemma, 7 NATURE REVS.: DRUG DISCOVERY 818, 823–24 (2008).
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the same time frame, sometimes dramatically. Of the four groups
followed, two represented brand-name submission classes (standard
supplementary new drug submissions (SNDS) and First in Class
SNDSs), and two represented generic submissions (standard
abbreviated new drug submissions (ANDS) and supplemental ANDS,
or SANDS). SNDSs, also known as “line extensions” of previously
existing products, usually involve changes to a pre-existing drug such as
a change in the route of administration (e.g., oral to intravenous),
dosage form (e.g., tablet to capsule), salt form (e.g., besylate to
mesylate), or indication (e.g., antidepressant to anxiolytic). For the
most part, getting a line extension or SNDS onto the market is a faster
process compared with drugs approved via the new drug submission
stream. This is true even where approval times for SNDS and NDS are
roughly equal, as production and marketing of line extension products
takes less time than producing and marketing truly new drugs, owing to
manufacturing experience and related competencies.
Drugs approved via NDS and SNDS routes can be classified as
either First in Class or Me Too. For the NDS route, First in Class drugs
are those that contain either a new ingredient or are directed to a new
use (or indication), whereas NDS Me Too drugs neither contain a new
ingredient nor are directed to a new use, but do have an improved
benefit/risk profile. For the SNDS route, relatively small changes to
existing chemical structures such as salts or isomers may still yield First
in Class or Me Too designations. The difference is that while both
SNDS First in Class and Me Too drugs can cover new chemical forms,
drugs directed only to a new use may be deemed First in Class SNDSs,
while those that do not are deemed Me Too. Because even a follow-on
First in Class must be directed to a new use as opposed to just a new
chemical form with altered benefit/risk, a higher level of innovation is
typically ascribed to follow-on First in Class as opposed to Me Too
18
drugs.
One of the most intriguing findings of Study 1 is that the number of
new Me Too and First in Class NDS NOCs decreased slightly over the
test period. By contrast, the number of follow-on Me Too SNDS and
First in Class SNDS NOCs increased significantly. Me Too SNDS
NOCs in particular doubled over the test period. Moreover, First in
Class SNDS NOCs increased in a strongly time-dependent manner,
18. For a comparison of Canadian and WHO First in Class and Me Too classifications
schemes, see Sawicka and Bouchard, supra note 11, at 108. “[U]nder the WHO methodology,
compounds that are in the same chemical family as the original First in Class drug are all
deemed to be Me Too drugs irrespective of whether they are directed to the new indications.”
Id.
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from a single drug in 2001 to twenty-two drugs in 2008. The slope of this
increase over time well exceeds even that for generic supplemental
submissions.
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Fig 2. Shifting Patterns of Drug Approval and Drug Regulation During the Period 2001–2008. a.
Market authorizations for several types of follow-on drugs increased over the 2001–2008 test
period. This includes, brand-name Supplemental New Drug Submission (SNDS; ) and SNDS
First In Class (SNDS FIC;z) approvals, and generic Abbreviated New Drug Submission (ANDS;
) and follow-on Abbreviated New Drug Submission (SANDS; {) approvals. b. In contrast,
approvals granted to brand-name firms for “new” drug submissions declined from a smaller
baseline over the same period. This included approvals from New Drug Submission (NDS; {),
New Active Substance (NAS; z) and NDS First In Class (NDS FIC; ) streams. c. Expedited
review pathway for drug approval is shifting towards probationary-type approval consistent with
emerging lifecycle models of regulation. Expedited drug approvals with no post-market
evidentiary obligations (Priority Review; ) decreased over the 2001–2008 test period while those
with significant post-market obligations conditions (NOC/c; z) increased steeply over the same
time frame. Reproduced courtesy of the Berkeley Technology Law Journal.©

Together with data showing a decline in all types of new or standard
submissions by brand-name firms and an increase in other types of
supplementary submissions assessed, these results suggest that the
Canadian pharmaceutical industry is expending increasingly fewer of its
resources on developing novel “first-of-kind” technologies, more on
leveraging existing technologies. As such, technology appropriation is
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alive and well in Canada.
The data from Study 1 suggest that the trend toward the “flexible
departure” limb of the emerging lifecycle model of drug regulation is
being accompanied by a small but significant trend for sponsors to meet
conditions associated with NOC/c approval (Fig. 3). This conclusion is
tempered, however, by the large number of outstanding NOC/c approvals
where the conditions have not yet been met. A second caveat is the fact
that there is not a great deal of data in this regard, given the gap between
issuance and conditions met in later years, which does not apply to
analysis of approvals per se. The observation that an increasing number
of drugs are being made available to the public under the circumstance
that they meet certain conditions in order to maintain market
authorization demonstrates that Health Canada is already approving
drugs with the Progressive Licensing Framework (PLF) in mind.
Positively, to date none of these drugs have been recalled for safety
reasons.
The second limb of Study 1 focused on the innovative character of
20
approvals granted between 2001 and 2008. As with the initial study,
our goal was to develop an independent method to quantify patterns in
innovative activity by pharmaceutical firms and to analyze this data in
relation to regulatory incentives designed to encourage pharmaceutical
innovation via provision of strong patent rights. The work was
specifically designed to probe the functional and structural link between
drug approval, drug patenting, drug litigation, and innovation.

19. As used here, the term “appropriation” refers to a party’s ability to capture profits
generated from their own inventions or related inventions. See generally David J. Teece,
Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration,
Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285 (1986).
20. Bouchard 2009, supra note 14.
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Fig. 3. Profile of Pharmaceutical Innovation in Canada between 2001–2008. a. New v. follow-on
approvals. Of total drugs approved over the test period, 15% constituted New Drug Submissions
(NDS: z) while 84% were for follow-on drugs (SNDS, ANDS and SANDS: z). b. Types of
follow-on approvals. Of follow-on approvals, 6.1% were for supplementary “First in Class” (SNDS
FIC: z) drugs while 59% were for Me-Too drugs (z). c. Brand name v. Generic approvals. Of all
drugs approved during the test period, 65.5% of approvals were granted to brand name drug
companies (NDS and SNDS: ) and 34.5% to generic companies (ANDS and SANDS: z). d. Most
innovative drugs. While 6.5% of approvals during the test period were directed to New Active
Substances (z; NAS) and 5.3% of all NDS and SNDS submissions were approved under an
expedited review process (z; Priority Review and NOC/c), only 1.23% of all drugs approved over
the period 2001–2008 were also directed to FIC therapies and contained a NAS (z). Areas are
approximations of calculated means for the entire test period. Note that area scales are linear for
©
panels a-c and log for panel d. Reproduced courtesy of the Berkeley Technology Law Journal.

The data revealed that the number of truly innovative drug products
was very small, amounting to just 1.87% of all approvals granted to
brand-name drug companies over the eight-year test period. The largest
fraction of drug development was directed to Me Too drugs (59%),
while follow-on drugs as a whole represented 85% of all approvals over
the test period. By contrast, the percentage of approvals that either
contained an NAS that was directed to a First in Class drug, even
irrespective of whether First in Class drugs were approved via the new
(NDS) or follow-on (SNDS) approval pathways, or that underwent
some form of expedited review was only 6.5%, 6.4%, and 5.3% of all
approvals granted between 2001 and 2008, respectively. The largest
category for new drugs assessed was for NDS approvals, and even then
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only 16% of all approvals went through this mechanism; the remaining
drugs were approved via SNDS and generic pathways. The data
illustrate that drug companies are focusing their efforts primarily on
follow-on drug development, and that this effort was rewarded by
Canadian regulators with large numbers of approvals directed to these
products.
Our qualitative findings on pharmaceutical innovation in Canada parallel
21
those observed in other jurisdictions, including the United States. That is,
the multinational pharmaceutical industry appears to be leaning away from
breakthrough drug development, towards less innovative products referred to
variously as follow-on, incremental, supplemental, line extension, Me Too,
and bioequivalent drugs. While our data do not speak directly to claims that
22
diminished innovation is due to the loss of “low hanging fruit” or spiraling
23
costs of drug development, we argue the results provide a third plausible
explanation for the diminution of breakthrough product development. That is,
innovation policy and drug regulation that are strongly dependent on
intellectual property rights can profoundly shape the rate and direction of
innovative activity by multinational firms antecedently, towards incentives
provided for by law and away from truly breakthrough products under
conditions where the two do not coincide.
B. Study 2*
24

In our second study (“Study 2”), we set out to empirically analyze

21. See, e.g., John Abraham & Courtney Davis, A Comparative Analysis of Drug Safety
Withdrawals in the UK and the US (1971–1992): Implications for Current Regulatory Thinking
and Policy, 61 SOC. SCI. & MED. 881 (2005); Editorial, European and French Pharmaceutical
Market Assessed by Prescrire in 2005: Mainly Bogus Innovation, 30 FARMACIA
HOSPITALARIA 68 n.2 (2006) [hereinafter Bogus Innovation]; Kenneth I. Kaitin et al.,
Therapeutic Ratings and End-of-Phase II Conferences: Initiatives To Accelerate the
Availability of Important New Drugs, 31 J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 17 (1991); Domenico
Motola et al., An Update on the First Decade of the European Centralized Procedure: How
Many Innovative Drugs?, 62 BRIT. J. OF CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 610 n.5 (2006); Drugs
in 2001: A Number of Ruses Unveiled, 11 PRESCRIRE INT’L 58, 58 (2002) [hereinafter Drugs
in 2001]; NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT., CHANGING PATTERNS OF
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 1, 7–14 (2002) [hereinafter PHARMACEUTICAL
INNOVATION]; New Medicines in 2007: Regulatory Agencies and Policy Makers Leave Public
Health in the Hands of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 17 PRESCRIRE INT’L 78 n.94 (2008)
[hereinafter New Medicines in 2007].
22. Fredric J. Cohen, Opinion, Macro Trends in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 4 NATURE
REV. DRUG DISCOVERY, Jan. 2005, at 78 [hereinafter Cohen 2005].
23. Joseph DiMassi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 152 (2003).
* For the full study, please refer to Ron A. Bouchard, Richard W. Hawkins, Robert Clark,
Ray Hagtvedt, & Jamil Sawani, Empirical Analysis of Drug Approval–Drug Patenting
Linkage for High Value Pharmaceuticals, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INT. PROP. 174 (2010).
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drug patenting patterns for high value drug candidates. We investigated
patenting and listing data associated with ninety-five drugs approved
between 2001 and 2008. Data were analyzed with regard to five
categories: (1) the entire cohort of drugs (Cohort; n=95), (2) the most
profitable drugs by sales (Most Profitable; n=33), (3) the drugs
approved via an expedited approval process without significant postmarket conditions (Priority Review; n=40), (4) the drugs approved via
expedited approval with significant post-market conditions (NOC/c;
n=16), and (5) the drugs approved via the Priority Review stream that
were also approved with significant post-market conditions (PR-NOC/c;
n=6). Drugs were, therefore, split into categories representing drugs
already vetted by the market to be blockbuster in nature, and those that
were granted expedited review status by regulators in the hopes they
would be blockbusters. For the sake of simplicity, only results
pertaining to the cohort are presented here.
The cohort was associated with 3,850 patents, resulting in a large
average patent per drug ratio of 40:1. In other words, each drug studied
was associated with at least 40 patents. Of these, 196 (5%) were listed
on the patent register to prevent generic entry under the NOC
Regulations. Patenting activity per drug took place over a relatively
long period of thirty-five years. The time required for peak patenting
per drug progressively declined over the course of 1977 to 2000, from
about twenty-five years to eight years. Averaged patenting activity,
expressed as year after first instance, exhibited a significant plateau over
an eight year period, between eight and sixteen years after the year of
first instance. During this time, peak patenting was maintained at an
average of about 2.5 patents per drug per year.
Statistical fits to the data suggest there were two components of
pharmaceutical patenting in between 1977 and 2001; a slower and
smaller amplitude component up to 1993 and a larger and faster
component following 1993. As illustrated by the data in Fig. 4, the
amount of patenting was approximately 2.5 times greater and 2.0 times
faster between 1993 and 2001 than patenting patterns from 1977 to 1993.
Given that the break in patenting activity in 1993 coincides with the
coming into force of the NOC Regulations, the results strongly suggest
that the linkage regime itself has substantially influenced both the
degree and rate of patenting activity by brand-name pharmaceutical
firms.

24. See Bouchard 2010, supra note 13.
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a

b

Fig 4. Fit of Cohort Patenting Data to Exponential Functions. Data were fit to two single
exponential functions using two different procedures. In panel a, data were split into two epochs;
1977–1993 (z) and 1993–2001 (|), the point of maximal rate of increase in patenting activity. Data
were then fit to a sum of two single exponential 4 parameter functions of the form A•exp(b•(Yd))+B, where A is amplitude, B is the rate constant of the exponential function and Y is calendar
year. Solid and dashed lines are fits to epochs one and two, respectively. Amplitudes and time
constants were 12.60 0.1467 and 30.24 and 0.2875 for the first and second epochs respectively. The
fits suggest the presence of a small and slower phase of patenting followed by a larger and faster
phase. In panel b, linear regression analysis was undertaken to probe whether a year-specific
change in the patent regime in 1993 resulted in a second exponential function. We assumed a data
generating process with the functional form: Y= •exp[( 0+ 1 I)t+ ], where Y is total patents, is a
noise term with zero mean and constant variance, t is the year, and I is an indicator variable taking
on the value 1 for year 1993 and later, and zero otherwise. A log transform allowed testing of the
null hypothesis ( 1= 0) using linear regression. The result (p=0.006955) suggests there is a shift in
the exponential growth of patenting in 1993. Raw data (¡) are the same as those in a. Reproduced
©
courtesy of the Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property.

We next investigated changes in global patterns of peak patenting
per drug for the cohort. We analyzed changes in the average time it
took for peak patenting per drug over the course of the period 1977–
2000 for the 95 drugs in the cohort. Data are expressed as the time after
the year of first issuance of a patent for a given drug. This was done to
probe the patenting strategy of pharmaceutical firms over the test
period.
During the first four years of the test period (1977–1980) the average
year to peak patenting activity was about twenty-five years. For the five
years between 1986 and 1991, this value decreased to about fifteen
years, and decreased further again to eight years for the five-year period
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between 1996 and 2000. Thus, there was a reduction of the time to peak
patenting from a maximum of twenty-five years in 1979 to a minimum of
7.5 years in 2000. This equals a 70% increase in the speed of maximal
patenting per drug over the course of twenty years. While this
conclusion is somewhat tentative given the lower numbers of patents
towards the end of the test period, the data suggest that pharmaceutical
firms have become significantly more efficient in their patenting efforts
over time. This conclusion is supported by the substantial growth in
patent listing in the last decade, the convergence of patenting and patent
listing data, and the decreasing time lag between drug approval and
drug patenting and patent listing.
Data in Study 2 were also analyzed within the context of patent type
(chemical, use, etc.) and therapeutic (cardiovascular, antibiotic, etc.)
classification schemes, the former of which was developed for this study.
Patent classifications were calculated based on whether patent claims
were directed to given content. The results demonstrate significant
preferences in the various groups towards discrete therapeutic and
patent classifications. Indeed, the cohort was associated with a vast
array of both patent and WHO therapeutic classifications. There were
5,859 individual patent classifications on the cohort, which amounted to
an average of 61 patent classes per marketed drug. These were
distributed widely across patent types, with particular concentrations for
Combination Therapy, Use and Administration patents, and a second
large grouping for Chemical and Process patents. The results on
therapeutic classifications indicated a relatively narrow scope of
therapeutic targets, with strong overlap between therapeutic classes
identified in the study and those with the highest domestic sales in
Canada.
Results from the patent classification study are particularly relevant
to analysis of the validity of the NOC Regulations. Readers may be
reminded that the two main regulatory mechanisms underpinning
follow-on innovations are the wide definition of a NAS and the wide
scope of uses and chemical derivatives permitted under the SNDS
stream. For example, a NAS may include isomers, derivatives, or salts
of chemical substances already approved for sale or biological
substances previously approved but differing in molecular structure,
25
nature of the source material, or even manufacturing process.
25. Memorandum from E. Somers on New Active Substances to Health Canada (June
4,
1991),
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfbdgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/nas_nsa_pol-eng.pdf [hereinafter Health Canada, New Active
Substances]; Health Canada, Notice of Compliance (NOC) Database Terminology (Oct. 1
2004),
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/prodpharma/notices-avis/noc-acc/term_noc_acc-
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Similarly, an SNDS may be filed for changes to a drug that is already
marketed by a sponsor: including minor changes to dosage, strength,
formulation, manufacture, labeling, route of administration, or
use/indication.
Either of these two approval pathways would be consistent with
what we have termed a “paradoxical approval-patent linkage,” whereby
pharmaceutical firms game the linkage system in order to obtain the
largest patent protection under the NOC Regulations for the products
with the lowest levels of innovation. The patent classification data
observed here show that the patent pool supporting submissions
directed to the SNDS approval stream is very large, as is the pool for
other approval types with narrow filing requirements (NAS, NOC/c,
Priority Review; SNDS First in Class). Similarly, the therapeutic
classification data indicate that firms are innovating in relatively lowrisk areas with established market presence. In addition to supporting
follow-on drug submissions, a wide array of patent classifications,
particularly for combination, use and chemical derivative patents, would
also provide fodder for listing on the patent register. A broad array of
patents can increase the market exclusivity period of blockbuster drugs
about to come off patent by either providing for further related followon drug submissions, or increasing the pool of “relevant” patents for
listing on the patent register.
Combined, the data in Study 2 demonstrate that firms are able to
identify attractive drug candidates both after regulatory approval and
during the approval process. During the approval stage, firms begin the
process of layering patents, listing patents on the patent register, and
obtaining further patents with broad classifications to expand the
boundary of legal protection afforded by the patent and linkage
regulation regimes. Broad patent classification in particular allows firms
to fill offers with candidates for later follow-on submissions and patent
listing candidates.
A final observation from Study 2 is that the linkage regime, acting in
combination with both the traditional patent system and the existing
drug approval framework, has proven to be a highly flexible tool in the
hands of sophisticated pharmaceutical firms.
For example, the
combination of the speed of patent listing compared with patenting and
the relatively low relevance requirement for listing has enabled
pharmaceutical firms to rapidly identify attractive drug targets for legal
protection even during the regulatory approval stage, particularly for
drugs undergoing some form of expedited approval.
eng.php.
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Identification of drugs for “rights layering” early in the approval
stage rather than later further serves the significant function of reducing
the regulatory lag at the front end of the product lifecycle while at the
same time extending market exclusivity at the end of a product lifecycle.
Together, the results from Study 2 show strong, increasing, and faster
utilization of both patent and linkage regulation regimes for high value
pharmaceuticals over time, particularly for drugs undergoing some form
of expedited approval.
C. Study 3*
26

Our third study (“Study 3”) was focused on the functional linkage
between approved drugs and extended patent protection afforded by
the NOC Regulations in a subgroup of the most profitable drugs in
Canada (n=16). We chose the top sixteen drugs for our initial study
because this cohort was likely to display the strongest patenting and
patent listing patterns. Pharmaceutical companies have a vested interest
to protect the market on their most profitable drugs, and the primary
means of doing so is via patenting. Each of the drugs studied under the
patent analysis were approved between 2001 and 2008 and were
analyzed as part of Study 1.

* Ron A. Bouchard, Jamil Sawani, Chris McLelland, Monika Sawicka & Richard W.
Hawkins. The Pas de Deux of Pharmaceutical Regulation and Innovation: Who’s Leading
Whom?, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1461, 1463 n.2 (2009).
26. Bouchard 2009, supra note 14.
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Fig 5. Patenting and Patent Listing Patterns Associated with Drug Approval. a. Total patents
issued by year associated with a subset of sixteen top selling drugs (); cumulative number of
patents associated with the subset ( ); and cumulative number of patents listed on the patent
register under linkage regulations associated with the subset (z). Note the strong convergence of
total and listed patents over the course of the test period. b. Total () and average (¡) number of
patents on approved drugs within the subset plotted as a function of the time after the priority date
on which the first patent on the subset was issued. c. Method used to calculate the temporal gap
between the date of mean drug approval on the patent subset (2005) and the inflection point (IP),
50th and 100th percentile of normalized maximum drug patenting and approvals. Data are from
the cumulative number of patents (z) above. d. Graph expressing the temporal relationship
between drug approval and the IP, 50th and 100th percentile of maximal normalized patents
granted per year (PY), cumulative patents per year (CPY), and cumulative patents listed on the
patent register per year (CPRY). Time points are calculated as the difference between the date of
drug approval (NOC) and the date of the IP, 50th and 100th percentile (NOC-x). The data suggest
drug patent listing is a better proxy for drug approval than drug patenting. Reproduced courtesy of
the Berkeley Technology Law Journal.©

Patents granted on the approval subset had a bell-shaped
distribution over time, peaking in 2001. There were a total of 772
patents on the 16 drug products. As illustrated in Fig. 5a, this
corresponded to an average patent per product ratio of 48:1. That is,
there was an average of 48 patents for each drug in the subset analyzed.
The fastest rate of grant occurred between approximately 1993 and
2001. Patenting reached a plateau by 2004. When expressed as year
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after first instance (Fig. 5b), patenting grants can be seen to occur over a
twenty-five year period on average. Listing data is also provided in Fig.
5a. As expected, it lags behind patenting activity. However, listing
activity catches up quickly, as indicated by the convergence of the two
curves over time.
Study 3 also investigated the temporal relationship between NOC
grants, patent issue, and patent listing in some detail. We found there
was a significant lag between the date on which NOCs were granted and
the dates on which patents of the same drug product were granted. This
pattern was observed independent of whether patents were expressed
by year of grant or cumulatively. This is not surprising in light of the
regulatory lag between drug patenting and drug approval. However, the
data were different for patent listings. As shown in Fig. 5d, the average
data for both the inflection point (the point at which the data
significantly depart from baseline) and the fiftieth percentile of
maximum exceeded the null point by only four and two years,
respectively. This lag can be compared with that of ten and eight years
for patenting data. Of interest, the calculated values for the fiftieth
percentile and peak patent listing were only one to two years on either
side of the null point. In other words, there was virtually no significant
lag between drug approval and patent listing as the test period
progressed from 2001 to 2008.
Data from the analysis described above suggest that patent listing
under the NOC Regulations appears to have evolved over time to be a
better proxy for drug development than drug patenting per se. This
result suggests that while patenting data remains an important reflection
of innovation incentives for domestic pharmaceutical companies, patent
listing may have evolved into a more contextually relevant indicator of
drug development in Canada.
While the idea that patent listing may better reflect firm drug
development strategy under pharmaceutical linkage, this analysis does
not reflect on trends for new and follow-on drugs specifically. We
therefore further explored the link between the timing of new and
follow-on drug approvals, expedited drug approvals, and associated
drug patenting, patent listing and litigation. In this analysis, drug
patenting and listing were assumed to represent incentives for
innovation whereas expedited drug approval was taken as a measure of
lifecycle-based regulatory incentives for innovation. In particular, we
compared fitted curves for cumulative patenting and patent listing
activity as well as that for expedited approval against concomitant fits to
new and follow-on drug approvals. The data indicated that neither the
steep time-dependent changes in patent grant, patent listing, nor
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NOC/c-type approval (expedited approval with significant postmarketing evidentiary requirements) were correlated with, and thus,
may not provide a measurable incentive for, pioneering drug
development. Patenting, patent listing, and NOC/c approvals were all
strongly non-linear in nature (i.e., occurring very rapidly) compared
with the slow linear changes in both new and follow-on drug approvals.
The three trends could be observed to occur either before or during
those for new and follow-on drug development.
The observations from the analysis above suggest that neither
patenting, patent listing, nor emerging lifecycle-based models of drug
regulation appear to have provided significant incentives for new drug
development in Canada. Results such as these support the conclusion
that the NOC Regulations provide a stronger incentive for follow-on
rather than pioneering drug development.
One of the most important observations of Study 3 was that the
linkage regime can, in the hands of sophisticated firms, essentially
double the cumulative term of patent protection on drug products. As
demonstrated by the dark blue symbols and line in Fig. 6, the average
period of patent protection associated with the “originating patent” was
about twenty years, from 1983 to 2003. This represents an average of
patent terms before (seventeen years from date of grant) and after
(twenty years from filing date) amendments made to patent legislation
pursuant to TRIPS. By comparison, the duration of cumulative
protection on the subset of most profitable drugs was about two-fold
longer, lasting from about 1987 to 2026. This yields a term of extended
patent protection, due solely to operation of linkage regulations, of
about forty-three years per drug on average. The primary basis for this
extension is the cumulative life of patents deemed legally relevant to the
original product that were listed on the patent register to prevent
generic entry. The averaged results from the sixteen drugs studied are
shown in Fig. 6 below.
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from the averaged data. Litigation data on this drug revealed an
astounding number of trials, motions, appeals, and decisions at the same
level of court with differing results. We identified eighty-two patents
®
®
associated with two drug forms of Omeprazole, Losec and Nexium,
that were granted over a period of twenty years. The patents had a
cumulative term of patent protection of close to fifty years. The priority
dates for the first and final patent were 1978 and 2005, respectively.
Therefore, the period of hypothetical patent protection on the
Omeprazole group ran from 1975 to about 2025. In comparison, the
®
first NOC for Omeprazole (Losec ) was granted on June 13, 1989,
yielding a regulatory gap of close to ten years. Of eighty-two patents
that were deemed relevant to Omeprazole, 27% (n=22) were listed on
the patent register. Compared to the average of 5% on the group, the
data indicate that once the market vets a compound as “high value,”
firms increase patent listing.
At the completion of our analysis (December 31, 2008), there were
61 separate trials on twenty-two listed patents, including 310 motions
(mean=5.08 per trial) and twenty-five final trial decisions. Of final
decisions, fourteen went on to appeal at the Federal Court of Appeal
and eight went on to the Supreme Court of Canada. Litigation occurred
over a term of sixteen years, essentially from the time the linkage
regulations came into force in 1993 until the present. Four trials on
twelve patents are currently ongoing. The average date on which
relevant trials ended, and thus, the date of “reactivation” of the average
generic approval was December 2003.
Under the terms of the NOC Regulations, litigation over patents
®
®
relating to Losec and Nexium resulted in a delay of market entry of
27
close to three (2.83) years for the group. According to IMS Health,
sales of the two drugs in drugstores and hospitals over the same time
frame were CN $1.4 billion. In comparison, total spending on
prescription pharmaceuticals rose from CN $11.7 billion in 2001 to CN

27. INTERCONTINENTAL MKTG. SERVS. HEALTH INC., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT TO
SHAREHOLDERS (2003), available at http://www.imshealth.com/portal/site/imshealth;
INTERCONTINENTAL MKTG. SERVS. HEALTH INC., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT TO
SHAREHOLDERS
(2002),
http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/NYS/RX/reports/ar2002.pdf; INTERCONTINENTAL MKTG. SERVS. HEALTH INC., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT TO
SHAREHOLDERS (2001), available at http://www.imshealth.com/portal/site/imshealth. See
also INTERCONTINENTAL MKTG. SERVS. HEALTH INC., CANADIAN PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY REVIEW (2001) (on file with author); INTERCONTINENTAL MKTG. SERVS.
HEALTH INC., CANADIAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY REVIEW (2002) (on file with
author); INTERCONTINENTAL MKTG. SERVS. HEALTH INC., CANADIAN PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY REVIEW (2003) (on file with author).
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$17.97 billion in 2004, representing an increase of 92%. This includes
an increase in out-of-pocket consumer spending from CN $2.56 billion
to CN $3.36 billion.
Data pertaining to Ompeprazole and other blockbuster drugs
subject to heavy litigation at the same time require updating, as
amendments to linkage laws have been made over the last three to four
years that have narrowed the scope of listed patents to those specific to
a given submission and that prevent multiple automatic injunctions per
reference product. Having said this, our newer data provide multiple
examples of similar “product clusters” enabled by linkage, a theory for
which is explored in Section III.A. below. It is reasonable to speculate
however that “but for” the existence of the linkage regime that generic
entry may have occurred closer to expiry of the originating patent or
patents, as anticipated by the government prior to the NOC Regulations
29
coming into force, with an accordingly shorter period of delayed entry.
Either way, the linkage regime has proved to be a highly effective
mechanism for extending market monopolies on profitable drugs.
D. Interpretation
A linkage regime that provides patent protection on poorly
innovative drugs that extends well beyond the term of originating
patents, not only has the potential to debilitate the patent system in the
short term, but also to weaken pharmaceutical innovation more
30
generally in the long term. In the context of the linkage regime, the
weak relevance requirement acts in combination with the automatic
injunction and low evidentiary requirements for new and follow-on drug
approval to yield a situation where the notion of patent protection can
be taken to a point near its logical extreme. The data reviewed above
suggest that if linkage regimes provide fertile grounds for firms to
compete at a lower level of innovation, they also discourage firms from
innovating at a level of competition that would provide the greatest
benefit to society. This dilemma can be illustrated by a comparison of
the data from Studies 1 and 3.
On the one hand, it was demonstrated that a very small fraction of
drugs approved by regulators over the eight-year test period could be
28. CAN. INST. FOR HEALTH INFO., DRUG EXPENDITURE IN CANADA, 1985 TO 2008,
at 6, 60 (2009).
29. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:8 Parliament of Canada, 8:37–40 (Dec. 1, 1992) (testimony of Minister Michael Wilson and
Dr. Elizabeth Dickerson).
30. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966); Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco,
Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067, ¶ 37 (Can.).
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considered truly breakthrough in nature based on several metrics. This
includes drugs approved via the NDS stream (16%), those containing a
NAS (6.1%), total drugs (NDS and SNDS) directed to First in Class
therapies (6.5%), those that underwent one of two pathways (priority
review; NOC/c) for expedited review (5.3%), and those that met the
most stringent requirements for breakthrough products (1.23%; 1.87%
of brand-name approvals).
On the other hand, the linkage study illustrated that patent
protection under linkage regulations does not discriminate between
poorly or strongly innovative drugs.
It arbitrarily offers to
pharmaceutical firms broad and long-lasting intellectual property rights
targets, regardless of the types of products being introduced into the
marketplace. This is a particularly relevant point for follow-on drug
products, which are well recognized to entail lower risks and costs to
31
pharmaceutical firms, yet which also are associated with an enhanced
term of monopoly pricing. As suggested by the data from Study 1, the
evolution toward a lifecycle-based regulatory approach to drug approval
will likely do little to affect the rate and direction of innovative activity
by firms absent shifts in legal incentives for breakthrough and follow-on
drug development.
Discordance between the basket of patent rights incentives for
innovation and resulting product development is further supported by
data from Study 3. For example, the close temporal relationship
between drug approval and patent listing and the strong convergence of
patent grants and patent listing following the coming into force of
linkage regulations provides evidence for the conclusion that patent
listing evolved into a more effective target, and thus, a better proxy, for
drug approval than drug patenting per se once the linkage regime came
into effect. Other evidence for this conclusion comes from data showing
that steep time-dependent changes in drug patenting, patent listing, and
the evolution toward lifecycle regulation appeared to have occurred
independently of concomitant trends for new and follow-on drug
approvals.
The outcome of this dynamic, supported by averaged data for
sixteen drugs and the single example of Omeprazole, is that
pharmaceutical firms can leverage government policy and regulation
where given the opportunity to maintain market share for drugs coming
off patent rather than developing new blockbuster drugs. The results
are not dissimilar to studies of complex political systems, where
“yardsticks” designed to measure progress reorient behavior narrowly
31. Cohen 2005, supra note 22, at 78.
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towards fulfillment of yardstick metrics.
Our analysis of the drug approval-patenting linkage shows that new
drug development has stagnated while follow-on drug development has
flourished since the NOC Regulations came into force. However, as
illustrated by the results in Study 2, these trends have been accompanied
by increasing and faster utilization of both established patent law and
emerging linkage regulations by pharmaceutical firms. Moreover, the
large array of patent and therapeutic classifications indicated that firms
are focused on expanding the ever-widening pool of patents for
purposes of both follow-on drugs and for patent listing purposes. The
data also support a focus by firms on a “paradoxical drug approvalpatent linkage,” whereby firms receive the largest scope of intellectual
property protection for the lowest level of innovation.
The data in Studies 1, 2, and 3 indicate that in combination the
existing framework for drug approval, the traditional patent system, and
the emerging linkage paradigm has afforded the largest scope of
intellectual property protection to pharmaceutical products in the
history of Canada. The implication of the results as a whole is that firms
are aiming ex ante at legal targets that provide the most return on
investment rather than innovative products providing the most benefit
to the public.
An important aspect of the work described above is that it provides
objective evidence demonstrating that even though many follow-on
drugs have little or no therapeutic value over existing products, they can
nevertheless be used to powerfully extend market exclusivity for
blockbuster drugs. Patents on such products can be used for this
purpose either by providing the basis for follow-on drug submissions or
by providing a large pool for patenting listing purposes. In either case,
breakthrough innovation is diminished at the same time as the timely
entry of generic products is delayed.
Finally, empirical data such as those reviewed above have
implications for innovation theory in general, which often posits that
incremental or follow-on innovation is just as important to overall
innovation as pioneering innovations. Indeed, the pharmaceutical
industry has been consistently heralded as the best example of the
success of the patenting regime, almost in the complete absence of
33
objective empirical data. In this regard, it is noteworthy that because

32. ROBERT JERVIS, SYSTEM EFFECTS: COMPLEXITY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE
87 (1997) (noting that “the interactions in the system may alter the meaning of the
yardstick.”).
33. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 9, at 212.
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of weak regulatory requirements for new and follow-on drug approval
and for patent listing, follow-on drugs that may have little or no
therapeutic benefit compared to existing drug products can be used to
substantially extend market exclusivity on blockbuster drugs that do
34
Thus, the social
have significant benefits to the public at large.
consequences of a regulatory preference for follow-on drugs may be
greater in the public health sector than other sectors of the economy.
This issue is explored more fully in Section III.A. below in terms of
product clusters.
II. ARE THE REGULATIONS A SUCCESS?
This section of the Article provides a discussion of the performance
of the linkage regime in light of the empirical data reported above and
the stated policy goals underpinning the NOC Regulations to stimulate
the development of new and innovative drugs and facilitate timely
market entry of generic drugs.
One of the major promises made by the U.S. pharmaceutical
35
industry in the lead-up to both Bill C-22 and Bill C-91, supported by
domestic universities, was to inject billions of dollars into domestic
research and development activities. This investment was specifically
targeted towards the production of innovative therapeutic products.
The Minister of Industry, Science and Technology, Michael Wilson,
along with the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Michael
Blais, both equated intellectual property rights with pharmaceutical
innovation and hailed the new regime as the beginnings of a new, more
36
innovative nation.
Mr. Wilson went further, declaring that the
injection of millions of dollars into domestic research and development
would enable Canada to transition into “a world-class pharmaceutical
37
industry. . . .” Claims of this nature were made at the same time as
government was receiving evidence to the effect that amendments to its
domestic patent laws would chill generic competition, cost Canadian
38
consumers between CN $4 and $7 billion over a fifteen-year period,
and that the CN $500 million in research and development investment
34. See infra notes 61 and 62 and accompanying text for detailed discussion of the
therapeutic value of follow-on drugs.
35. Harrison, supra note 4, at 491.
36. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:8 Parliament of Canada, 8:39–42 (Dec. 1, 1992).
37. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:8 Parliament of Canada, 8:30 (Dec. 1, 1992).
38. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:7 Parliament of Canada, 7:68–92 (Dec. 1, 1992).
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by multinational firms was actually composed in large part of substantial
39
tax incentives ranging from 50% to 70%, depending on the province.
Experience since the dates on which pharmaceutical linkage came
into force in the United States and Canada has shown that the legal
definitions of “research” and “development” costs are very
40
controversial, with industry critics claiming that marketing, advertising,
41
opportunity and other related costs are in fact driving this line item.
There is ample evidence demonstrating that the pharmaceutical industry
will take whatever steps necessary to protect what it sees as confidential

39. For a review of the evidence in front of the House of Commons in the context of
Bills C-22 and C-91, see Harrison, supra note 4, at 511–524 and Jordan, supra note 3. In the
Parliamentary debate leading up to enactment of Bill C-91, it was widely noted by several
Members of Parliament that the CN $300–500 million figure had to be reduced in accordance
with provincial tax incentives, which amounted to fifty-five, sixty, and seventy cents on the
dollar in Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec, respectively, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of
the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 34:4 Parliament of Canada, 4:14, 4:39 (Nov. 27, 1992)
and id. at 34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:38, 5:40, 5:91 (Nov. 30, 1992). During crossexamination, federal employees acknowledged that these figures were correct and that the
calculations were intentionally left out of government reports on topic leading to the
hearings. Id. at 34:6 Parliament of Canada 6:10 (Nov. 30, 1992).
40. For a detailed history of litigation over public disclosure of pharmaceutical R&D
costs, see generally U.S. CONG. OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, PHARMACEUTICAL R&D:
COSTS, RISKS, AND REWARDS 284•88 (1993) [hereinafter OFF. OF TECH ASSESSMENT].
The U.S. Supreme Court, in the seminal Bowsher v. Merck Co. decision, held that
pharmaceutical R&D and related costs, constituted confidential information and, thus, that
the federal government did not have the authority to compel disclosure of such information.
460 U.S. 824, 843 (1983). For a more recent discussion of pharmaceutical R&D costs see U.S.
NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, NIH RESPONSE TO CONFERENCE REPORT REQUEST FOR PLAN
TO ENSURE TAXPAYER’S INTERESTS ARE PROTECTED (2001),
available at
http://www.nih.gov/news/070101wyden.htm. In Canada, data submitted by pharmaceutical
companies are deemed to be “commercially sensitive” and as such constitute confidential
information under the Federal Access to Information Act. See R.S.C., 1985 c. A-1 20(6).
Under Section 20(6), disclosure can only be made where it is in the public interest and relates
to public health and safety. Id. Health Canada will not, however, release information where
public interest in disclosure is outweighed by financial loss or prejudice to the competitive
position of the disclosing party. Id. See also NAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 1711; TRIPS, supra
note 2, at art. 39 (pertaining to data and market exclusivity, which deem commercially
sensitive information to be confidential). See generally Regulatory Impact Analysis
Statement, 138 C. Gaz. pt. I, at 3712 n.50 (2004). (Regulations Amending the Food and Drug
Regulations [1390 - Data Protection]), as modified by Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement,
140 C. Gaz. pt. I, at 1598 n.24 (2006) (Regulations Amending the Food and Drug Regulations
(Data Protection)).
41. See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:4 Parliament of Canada, 4:12, 4:20 (Nov. 27, 1992) (testimony of the Canadian Medical
Association) and id. at 34:7 Parliament of Canada, 7A:51 (Dec. 1, 1992) (testimony from
Green Shield). For a discussion of the role of marketing generally in Canada, see Trudo
Lemmens & Ron A. Bouchard, Regulation of Pharmaceuticals in Canada, CANADIAN
HEALTH L. AND POL’Y 311, 312 (3d ed. 2007).
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information relating to research and development expenditures, even
43
when the U.S. Government Accountability Office is doing the asking.
In light of uncertainties as to how much financial support foreign firms
have, in fact, provided to domestic research and development activities,
the remaining discussion focuses on the data we do have in hand; that is,
whether drugs approved following enactment of the NOC Regulations
constitute new or follow-on drugs and the degree to which the legal link
between drug approval and drug patenting under the NOC Regulations
has provided for extended intellectual property protection that would
not have occurred ‘but for’ operation of the linkage regime.
The following section provides a brief historical overview of portions
of the debate leading up to the enactment of the linkage regime,
discussion of the original policy intent underpinning the regulations
according to the federal government, a review of selected Supreme
Court of Canada jurisprudence and principles of statutory interpretation
that may be instructive when interpreting the broad purpose of the
linkage regime, and finally, a reinterpretation of the empirical data in
Studies 1, 2, and 3 based on the above material.
A. Debate Preceding Bill C-91
As well described in the literature and case law, compulsory
licensing of pharmaceuticals was introduced in Canada in 1923 and
expanded yet again in 1969 to control increasing drug costs. In 1987,
amendments to the Patent Act in the form of Bill C-22 limited
compulsory licensing and created the Patented Medicine Prices Review
Board (PMPRB) to ensure that the prices of patented pharmaceuticals
were not excessive. The second, and more major, round of reforms
44
came in 1993, at which time Bill C-91 eliminated compulsory licensing,
harmonized patent protection of pharmaceuticals in Canada with other
developed nations, and enacted the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations. Not surprisingly, many of the issues subject
to intense criticism and judicial review since then were raised in the
limited period of examination of Bill C-91, during the end of the 34th
Session of Parliament in December 1992. These issues include: the
impact of the bill on drug costs, domestic research and development
investments, patent terms, job creation, and the trickle-down effects of
42. Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and
Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837
(1980); Jeffery M. Drazen, Who Owns the Data in a Clinical Trial?, 8 SCI. ENG. ETHICS 407
(2002).
43. OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 40.
44. The Patent Act Amendment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 2 (Can.).
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increased public health costs. However, with one major exception, the
debate was characterized by a significant lack of foresight about the
extent to which the reforms would impact patent protection for
pharmaceuticals and the regulatory mechanisms through which this
change would be effected.
One of the primary points of contention in the Bill C-91 debate was
investment of money by foreign multinationals into domestic research
and development activities and the translation of this support into new
and innovative products. The Minister of Industry, Science and
Technology, the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, and
almost all of the major provincial universities equated increased
intellectual property protection with increased research, increased
45
innovation, and increased national productivity.
In particular,
extended patent rights were seen as the gateway to enhanced
production of new and innovative technologies that could compete
globally. Support of expanded patent protection by industry and
government sectors is well known. Less known, however, was the role
of the Canadian university system in this process. University advocates,
including those with clear conflicts of interest, claimed that industry
profits resulting from enhanced patent protection would create a better
46
society for Canadians. It was simply assumed by university advocates
that increased intellectual property protection was positively related to
increased innovation and increased therapeutic benefit to the public.
This sentiment was not unanimous among Legislative Committee
members or witnesses appearing before the Committee. In particular,
the Committee heard evidence from at least two major reports to the
47
contrary that bear further scrutiny. A 1981 OECD study noted that
when governments with historically low levels of pharmaceutical
45. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:8, 5:114, 5:116 (Nov. 30, 1992) and id. at 34:8 Parliament of
Canada, 8:24, 8:28 (Dec. 1, 1992) (testimony of Tyrell, UT, Group of 10, Minister Blais, and
Minister Wilson).
46. See, e.g., Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill
C-91, 34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:20 (Nov. 30, 1992) (testimony of Lorne Tyrrell, who
himself was the recipient of substantial pharmaceutical funding, which helped to create a
spin-out company from which he personally profited). The notion that pharmaceutical funds
were “vital” to the health of Canadian universities was supported by testimony from other
university administrators, including the so-called “group of 10.” See, e.g., id. at 34:5
Parliament of Canada, 5:116.
47. M.L. Burstall, J.H. Dunning, & A. Lake, Multinational Enterprises, Governments
and Technology—the Pharmaceutical Industry, (Paris: OECD, 1981) (cited in the Canadian
Health Coalition and Medical Reform Group Brief, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of
the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5A:73, A5:83 (Nov. 30,
1992)).
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research and development try to stimulate it through policy levers such
as patent rights, the results have been disappointing. The Eastman
48
Commission similarly noted that Canada lacks the fundamental
resources to be a global force in pharmaceutical research and
development. The Commission went further, stating that providing
multinational firms with enhanced domestic patent rights would not
increase domestic innovation, given long established research and
49
As argued by one Committee
development centers elsewhere.
50
member, conclusions such as those of Eastman and the OECD were
consistent with data from a federal study showing Bill C-22 had minimal
impact on university research and development activity. Nevertheless,
the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Harvie Andre, in the
lead up to Bill C-22, and Michael Wilson, the Minister of Industry,
Science and Technology at the time Bill C-91 was debated, continued to
assert that increased patent rights would enable Canada to innovate on
a “world scale” and to develop a “world-class pharmaceutical
51
industry . . .”
A point that resonates particularly well with the data reported in
Study 1 also was raised by the Canadian Association of Consumers
(CAC). The CAC expressed concern that patent reforms providing
greater protection for Me Too and Line Extension drugs would come at
the cost of truly innovative drugs and innovative health research
generally. Citing the Eastman report, the CAC noted that patent rights
are not inalienable and are granted by governments cautiously with the
52
specific purpose of stimulating an “appropriate amount of innovation.”
However, the issue of including definitions of the desired level of
48. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY. (Supply and Services Canada 1985) (cited in Minutes of Proceedings and
Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:12 (Nov. 30,
1992)).
49. This point was also raised by the Canadian Consumer Protection Agency in its
submissions (cited in Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on
Bill C-91, 34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:41 (Nov. 30, 1992)).
50. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:12 (Nov. 30, 1992) (Testimony of Mr. MacDonald (Dartmouth)
(citing a Canadian Industry, Science and Technology Report, entitled “Impact of
Pharmaceutical Company Sponsored Research on Basic Research in Canadian
Universities.”)).
51. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:8 Parliament of Canada, 8:30 (Dec. 1, 1992) (Testimony of Minister Wilson); Minutes of
Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 34:5 Parliament of
Canada, 5A:73, 5A:81 (Nov. 30, 1992) (CHC Brief).
52. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:60, 5A:19, 5A:20, 5A:30 (Nov. 30, 1992) (Canadian Association
of Consumers, submissions and brief).
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innovation resulting from increased patent rights or even evidencebased output metrics for research and development investments was not
taken up by many in the debate despite repeated calls for such outcomes
53
by some participants in the hearings.
Insightful comments were also made by the CAC on the potential
ramifications of extended patent protection for the development of new
54
and innovative drugs. Milton Friedman was cited to the effect that
patent monopolies too often provide strong incentives to shift research
and development towards products like Me Too drugs where patents
are more easily granted. The key observation being that, as with patents
55
granted by the Patent & Trademark Office, drug regulators are in the
routine and predictable habit of granting approvals on products with
low innovative value. As used here, the phrase “low innovative value”
refers to follow-on drugs that have little or no therapeutic benefit over
existing marketed drugs.
Indeed, the Committee heard evidence from an Industry, Science
56
and Technology study before the Committee that indicated that 80%
of clinical practitioners deemed domestic research and development to
be in service of Me Too drugs. This observation accords with our data
53. Both the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) and Canadian Association of
Consumers (CAC) requested that the federal government take an “evidence-based”
approach to assessing research and development costs and the impact of patent reforms on
the costs and benefits of the public health system. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of
the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:53 (Nov. 30, 1992)
(CAC); id. at 34:4 Parliament of Canada, 4:8, 4A:18, 4:10 (Nov. 27, 1992) (CMA); Harrison,
supra note 4, at 526 (concluding in his study of the political and economic factors
underpinning Bill C-22 and Bill C-91 that “one cannot persuasively argue that the Mulroney
administration tied or linked this costly policy (repeal of compulsory licensing) to any
tangible benefit.”). Indeed, during the debate over repeal of compulsory licensing and patent
reforms in the lead up to TRIPS, NAFTA, and Bill C-22, proponents of increased patent
protection were criticized for the lack of commitments by the pharmaceutical industry that
would be “measureable and enforceable.” Id. The Minister of Consumer and Corporate
Affairs at the time, Harvie Andre, replied that output metrics were not necessary, saying
instead “[w]e prefer carrots to whips. If it turns out that the donkey will not go with the
carrot then maybe you will have to use the whip.” Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of
the Legislative Committee on Bill C-22, 33:2 Parliament of Canada, 1:11, 1545 (December 16,
1982) (cited in Jordan, supra note 3, at 31–32).
54. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5A:30 (Nov. 30, 1992).
55. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
1495 (2001).
56. CHC Brief, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on
Bill C-91, 34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5A:72, 5A:83 (Nov. 30, 1992). (citing K.M. Taylor, The
Impact of the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Clinical Research Programs on Medical Education,
Practice and Researchers in Canada: a Discussion Paper, in CANADIAN PHARMACEUTICAL
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: FOUR SHORT-TERM STUDIES (Dept. of Industry, Science
and Technology, Ottawa 1991)).
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that nearly 60% of all drugs approved by Canadian regulators between
57
2001 and 2008 were Me Too drugs. It is also consistent with statements
made by the Medical Directors at Pfizer and Squibb that as much as
75% of scientific research had been channeled into “copycat drugs and
58
unimportant combinations.”
Even Dr. Eastman, while providing
testimony before the Committee as Chair of the PMPRB, acknowledged
that there is little therapeutic benefit to be gained from Me Too and,
59
particularly, Line Extension drugs. This statement accords with the
results of later studies conducted in Canada, France, and the United
60
States, including those in Studies 1, 2 and 3. Finally, the Committee
heard testimony about the “natural experiment” in Italy, where de novo
institution of patent protections that were harmonious with those in the
United States actually reduced national innovation and drove up the
61
costs of drugs. Acknowledging room for debate in the interpretation
of these studies, it is nevertheless clear that at the time the linkage
regime came into force, there was significant evidence to suggest that
increased patent rights would lead to neither enhanced innovation nor
timely generic entry.
In retrospect, perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the debate
leading up to the passage of Bill C-91 was that Section 4 of the Patent
Act Amendment Act containing the linkage regulations was hardly
debated at all, let alone noticed by most participants at the hearings.
The original goal of the amendments was to allay concerns by brandname drug manufacturers that generic firms might use the provisions of
the legislation allowing generics to seek regulatory approval without
being subject to infringement (the so-called “early working” exception)
to sell these products before the patent expired.
Misunderstandings of the purpose, procedures, and even existence
of the linkage regulations were widespread.
For example, the

57. Bouchard 2009, supra note 14, at 1491.
58. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:7 Parliament of Canada, 7:20 (Dec. 1, 1992).
59. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:7 Parliament of Canada, 7:46 (Dec. 1, 1992).
60. PATENTED MEDICINE PRICES REVIEW BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 2000, 24
(2001); Bogus Innovation, supra note 21; Drugs in 2001, supra note 21; Kenneth I. Kaitin,
supra note 21; Joel Lexchin, Intellectual Property Rights and the Canadian Pharmaceutical
Marketplace: Where Do We Go From Here?, 35 INT’L. J. HEALTH SERVS. 237, 243 (2005);
Domenico Motola, supra note 21; PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION, supra note 21 at 7; and
New Medicines in 2007, supra note 21.
61. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:134 (Nov. 30, 1992) (Canadian Health Coalition); id. at 34:7
Parliament of Canada, 7:13 (members of Parliament) (Dec. 1, 1992).
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Committee heard testimony that only sixteen drugs would be affected
62
by the regulations. Several policy makers called as witnesses claimed
63
they were not sure even why they were called to the proceedings,
64
stating on a number of occasions that they lacked the qualifications to
comment on Bill C-91 even though they were responsible for drafting
related policy documents based on which more senior officials were
testifying. Also common was the assertion that drugs that would be
affected by the legislation were only associated with one patent, and
thus, it was only one patent extension that generics had to contend with
when waiting for market entry. The most significant comments of this
nature came from Dr. Elizabeth Dickson, Director General, Chemical
and Bio-Industries Branch, Department of Industry, Science and
Technology. Dr. Dickson testified that, “I must explain that when a
new medicine comes on the market there is a main patent. When that
main patent expires, anyone may copy that product and bring it to
65
market.”
The general consensus at the hearings, included in testimony from
66
67
the Canadian Health Collation, Dr. Dickson, and Michael Wilson,
68
Minister of Industry, Science and Technology, was that patent reforms
pursuant to Bill C-91 would increase market exclusivity for brand-name
pharmaceuticals by only one to three years.
The lone voice of dissent was Dr. Stephen Schondelmeyer, a U.S.
economist and pharmacologist who conducted an independent study on
the potential impact of Bill C-91. It is not surprising an American would
bring the most experienced voice to the table. Indeed, it is obvious from
the language, concepts, and even the measurements he employed in his
62. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:126 (Nov. 30, 1992) (comment made by a Vice President of
Research from UBC).
63. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:6 Parliament of Canada, 6:4 (Nov. 30, 1992) (Mr. David Blaker, Head, Risk Assessment
and Management Section, Bureau of Drug Research, of National Health and Welfare).
64. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:6 Parliament of Canada, 6:6–7, 6:9–11 (Nov. 30, 1992) (Mr. Blaker). Another witness, Mr.
Ross Duncan (Consumer Policy Branch, Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs),
testified that the only data he used to construct his report on the impact of Bill C-91 was data
provided by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of Canada (PMAC). Id. at 6:12.
65. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:8 Parliament of Canada, 8:37 (Dec. 1, 1992) (emphasis added).
66. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:76; 5:133 (Nov. 30, 1992).
67. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:8 Parliament of Canada, 8:40 (Dec. 1, 1992).
68. Id.
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analysis that Dr. Schondelmeyer had several years of experience with
the U.S. Hatch-Waxman linkage regime prior to giving testimony
relating to Bill C-91. In addition to predictions based on empirical data,
the most important contribution made to the debate was introducing for
the first time a focus on cumulative market exclusivity rather than on
patent term per se:
In fact, you may not realize that most pharmaceutical products
have two, three, or even four patents that protect them, not just
one patent. They’ll have a patent on the chemical entity itself.
There’ll be a patent on the dosage form. There’ll be a patent on
the use of the product in some cases, and sometimes a patent on
the process by which the pharmaceutical is made. So one can’t
analyse [sic] the impact of this patent extension simply by looking
at the extension of an individual patent. What you have to analyse
[sic] is the effect of the combination of those patents that are
extended and how much that extends the total market exclusivity
69
of a given pharmaceutical.
Based on his study, Dr. Schondelmeyer suggested that, in sharp
contrast to the three years of market extension alluded to above, 33% of
products affected by Bill C-91 would have increased market exclusivity
70
by a term of ten years or more. Moreover, due to increasingly harmful
effects on innovation, the short-term effects would be far less onerous
than the long-term effects, with the worst impact on innovation and
extended market exclusivity being seen about ten years after Bill C-91
71
came into force. As discussed in more detail below, this is consistent
with our data from Studies 1 and 3 showing steadily declining new drug
development, steadily increasing follow-on innovation, steadily
increasing patent protection over the last decade accompanied by
increasing delays for generic entry. As noted above, Dr. Dickson and
Michael Wilson vigorously denied the importance of cumulative market
exclusivity, maintaining that only one patent per drug prevented generic
entry and that Bill C-91 would only increase exclusivity by a maximum
of three years.
69. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:7 Parliament of Canada, 7:68 (Dec. 1, 1992) (emphasis added).
70. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:7 Parliament of Canada, 7:68, 7A:111 (Dec. 1, 1992).
71. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:7 Parliament of Canada, 7:70 (Dec. 1, 1992). (Professor Schondelmeyer assessed the net
cumulative savings to Canadians (individual consumers, hospitals and insurance plans) from
1993 to 2010 would be CN $7 billion in constant 1993 dollars).
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In addition to the strength of the U.S. pharmaceutical lobby, trade
73
74
harmonization efforts in the context of GATT and NAFTA, pressures
75
from Quebec politicians and lobbyists, and concerns about incoming
then-President-Elect Bill Clinton perhaps looking to a system of price
76
control for pharmaceuticals not unlike that of the PMPRB, another
reason for the patent reforms of Bill C-22 and C-91 was provided by the
CAC. In its testimony before the Parliamentary Committee on Bill C77
91, the group claimed that patent reforms such as those enshrined in
Bill C-22 and Bill C-91 represented a naïve effort by the federal
government to attract research and development funds in competition
with other global jurisdictions with more established research and
development bases that were using their patent systems and tax bases in
the same way. The CAC claimed that leveraging intellectual property
strategy in this manner could not reasonably result in positive social
welfare outcomes. Rather, the more likely result was that reforms of
this nature would induce a flow of capital to nations who have taxpayers
78
with the deepest pockets. Instead of stimulating innovation, or even
72. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:42 (Nov. 30, 1992) (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives
(CCPA)). The pharmaceutical industry was reportedly the second largest contributor to U.S.
election campaign funding. See, e.g., How Health PACs Spend Millions to Influence Elections,
Washington Post, Mar. 21, 1989, at 14 (cited in 34:7 Parliament of Canada, 7A:45 (Dec. 1,
1992)).
73. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:42 (Nov. 30, 1992) (CCPA).
74. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:49 (Nov. 30, 1992).
75. For a first-hand view, see all nine volumes of Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence
of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 34 Parliament of Canada (1992). For an arm’s
length view, see generally Harrison, supra note 4; Tancer, supra note 4.
76. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:73 (Nov. 30, 1992); id. at 34:7 Parliament of Canada, 7:18
(Karpoff), 7:99 (Canadian Drug Manufacturers Association (CDMA)) (Dec. 1, 1992). But
see id. at 34:8 Parliament of Canada, 8:37 (Dec. 1, 1992) (Minister Wilson, for a strong
rebuttal of this argument). For a historical discussion of why President Clinton might support
price controls in the United States while seeking intellectual property privileges globally, see
Harrison, supra note 4, at 461, 522, 523, 526.
77. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:54–57 (Nov. 30, 1992).
78. As a reminder, between fifty and seventy percent of the proposed sum of CN $500
million that the pharmaceutical industry would invest in domestic research and development
was composed of provincial tax breaks. This is particularly relevant given testimony by Dr.
Joel Lexchin before the C-91 Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the
Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 34:5 Parliament of Canada, 5:135 (Nov. 30, 1992) that the
majority of profits for provincial drug plans are due to savings from generic drugs. In
addition to provincial tax savings, Canada is known to have one of the more generous
Scientific Research and Experimental Development (SRED) tax credit programs. Id.
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providing incentives for innovation, the net result is capital market
protectionism by multinational pharmaceutical firms. It is here where
the “paradoxical drug approval-drug patenting linkage” described in our
79
Northwestern study is particularly relevant, as the evidence we
obtained suggests that firms may be strongly targeting their drug
development efforts towards products with the greatest patent
protection and the least amount of innovation.
A related point, which accords well with later developed models of
80
81
policy resistance and policy failure is the apparent failure of both
legislators and policy-makers to at least anticipate some of the
unintended consequences and feedback loops of rapidly pushing
through widespread patent reforms based on a hitherto unexplored link
between the goals and objects of industrial patent law with those of food
and drug law:
[A]s one involved in public policy, often the decisions we make
quickly and without thorough evaluation are decisions that come
back to haunt us. Most legislation is precipitated by some critical
event that has occurred. We try to quickly develop legislation
that responds to that critical event and then often find out after
the fact that in addition to trying to solve the initial problem we
have created a number of unintended consequences down the
82
line that we have to go back and fix and correct.
B. “Original Policy Intent”
Often courts are left without clear guidance by government, either
before or after legislation or regulations come into force. Fortunately,
the specific policy grounds underpinning the NOC Regulations have
been articulated by the federal government in numerous government
83
Regulatory Impact Analysis Statements (RIASs). The Supreme Court
79. See supra Section III.
80. See generally John D. Sterman, All Models Are Wrong: Reflections on Becoming a
Systems Scientist, 18 SYS. DYNAMICS REV. 501 n.4 (2002).
81. See generally Barry Bozeman & Daniel Sarewitz, Public Values and Public Failure
in US [sic] Science Policy, 32 SCI. AND PUB. POL’Y 119 n.2 (2005); Barry Bozeman, PublicValue Failure: When Efficient Markets May Not Do, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 145, 145 (2002).
82. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:7 Parliament of Canada, 7:92 (Dec. 1, 1992).
83. Evidence of legislative intent regarding balancing patent enforcement and generic
entry can be found in early RIAS documents. See 138 C. Gaz. 50 Pt. I, 3714 (2004); 140 C.
Gaz. 24 Pt. I, 1601 (2006); 142 C. Gaz. 13 Pt. II, 1390, 1588 (2008); Health Can., Health Prods.
& Food Branch, Guidance Document, Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
Regulations
(2010),
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfbdgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/applic-demande/guide-
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of Canada has ruled that such documents constitute proper evidence of
legislative intent, including in the context of litigation under the
84
regulations.
According to a series of RIAS documents over a period of
approximately ten years, the “original policy intent” in enacting the
linkage regime was to balance patent enforcement over new and
innovative drugs with the timely market entry of generic drugs. The two
pillars of the regulations were to increase production of new and
innovative drugs while getting older drugs genericized as quickly as
possible. Importantly, the NOC Regulations were intended to operate
85
in accordance with the established principles of patent law, and to
further the “societal imperative” of developing new remedies to
86
enhance public health. The specific linkage between the goals and
objectives of food and drug law with those of patent law is said to
reaffirm the “stability, predictability and competitiveness of Canada’s
87
pharmaceutical patent regime”; a link vetted by multinational
pharmaceutical firms themselves before and after the Canadian linkage

ld/postnoc_change_apresac/noc_pn_framework_ac_sa_cadre-eng.pdf [hereinafter Health
Canada Guidance]. An articulation of the government’s pharmaceutical policy as it relates to
the NOC Regulations can be found in the June 17, 2006 RIAS, which states:
The Government’s pharmaceutical patent policy seeks to balance effective patent
enforcement over new and innovative drugs with the timely market entry of their
lower-priced generic competitors. The current manner in which that balance is
realized was established in 1993, with the enactment of Bill C-91, the Patent Act
Amendment Act, 1992, S.C. 1993, c. 2.
140 C. Gaz. 24 Pt. I, 1611 (2006). See generally 132 C. Gaz. 11 Pt. I, 553 (1998); 133 C. Gaz. 21
Pt. II, 2355 (1999). Evidence of legislative intent regarding the “original policy intent” of
encouraging development of new and innovative drugs can be found in both RIAS and
related Guidance Document.
84. Biolyse Pharma Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533, ¶¶ 47, 156,
157 (Can.). Justice Binnie stated:
It has long been established that the usage of admissible extrinsic sources regarding
a provision’s legislative history and its context of enactment could be examined. I
held in Francis v. Baker, at para. 35, that “[p]roper statutory interpretation
principles therefore require that all evidence of legislative intent be considered,
provided that it is relevant and reliable.” Consequently, in order to confirm the
purpose of the impugned regulation, the intended application of an amendment to
the regulation or the meaning of the legislative language, it is useful to examine the
RIAS, prepared as part of the regulatory process . . . .
Id. at ¶156. See RUTH SULLIVAN, SULLIVAN AND DRIEDGER ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF
STATUTES 499•500 (4th ed. 2002).
85. Biolyse, [2005] 1 S.C.R. at ¶¶ 47, 156–157; AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada
(Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560 (Can.); ratiopharm inc. v. Wyeth and Wyeth
Canada, [2007] F.C.A. 264 (Can.).
86. 138 C. Gaz. 50 Pt. I, 3714 (2004).
87. 142 C. Gaz. 13 Pt. II, 1390 (2008).
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88

regime came into force.
In the United States, where pharmaceutical linkage first came into
force, the purpose of Hatch-Waxman was explicitly to balance the two
competing policy objectives of inducing brand pharmaceutical firms to
make the investments necessary to develop new and innovative drug
products while also enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic
89
copies of those drugs to market as soon as possible. As noted by
Senator Hatch at the time the legislation came into force said “The
public receives the best of both worlds—cheaper drugs today and better
90
drugs tomorrow.”
Therefore, in addition to stimulating pioneering
drug development, a second major policy goal of linkage in the Unites
91
States was to facilitate timely generic entry. In its report on HatchWaxman, the Committee on the Judiciary was explicit as to what public
policy grounds were involved in achieving the balance of these
competing policy goals, stating that early generic availability would
substantially assist in the reduction of health care costs for the poor, the
under-insured, elderly, and the government as a purchaser of
prescription drugs. In addition, and given the regulatory nature of the
industry involved, early-working allowing a shortening of the delay of
generic entry was held not to unduly encroach on the patent rights of
brand firms and to properly enhance competition between brand and
92
generic firms.
Hence the goal of linkage in both originating jurisdictions was to
facilitate timely generic entry while also stimulating the development of
new and innovative drugs.
What does it mean for a drug to be “new and innovative?” When

88. In his 2003 testimony before the House of Commons Standing Committee on
Industry, Science and Technology, the CEO of GlaxoSmithKline stipulated that the NOC
Regulations ensured balance within Canada’s patent regime and encouraged innovation into
new therapies. Jordan, supra note 3, at 66 (emphasis added). For an example of
pharmaceutical literature highlighting the importance of linkage regulations see CANADA’S
RESEARCH-BASED PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES (RX&D) INFORMATION GUIDE 2002,
Section 2: Industry Issues (2002); ASTRAZENECA CAN., THE PATENT ACT & LINKAGE
REGULATIONS: ESSENTIAL TOOLS FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF MEDICAL SCIENCE IN
CANADA
(2009),
http://www.astrazeneca.ca/documents/en/aboutus/PatentActLinkageRegulations.pdf.
89. Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990); H.R. Rep. No. 98-857,
pt. 1, at 14–15 (1984); Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
90. Richard Epstein & Bruce Kuhlik, Navigating the Anticommons for Pharmaceutical
Patents: Steady the Course on Hatch-Waxman, n.24 (Univ. of Chi. L. & Econ., Working Paper
No. 209, 2004) (citing Congressional Record – Senate at 23764 (August 10, 1984).
91. Daniel R. Cahoy, Patent Fences and Constitutional Fence Posts: Property Barriers
to Pharmaceutical Importation, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 623 (2005).
92. H.R. Rep. 98-857, pt. 2, at 25 (1984).
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drafting the NOC Regulations, the federal government did not provide
specific definitions for these terms (in RIAS documents or otherwise),
nor did it provide a Preamble as one often finds preceding legislation.
The implication is that the matter was left for the courts to adjudicate or
93
that the government did not, or would not, say one way or the other.
94
According to the Oxford International Dictionary, the word
“innovate” evolved from the Latin innovare (1548), to make new. The
term focuses on bringing forth something completely new, novel, or
revolutionary into existence. The word “new,” from the Greek véos,
Latin novus, and Old English néowe, refers to something that did not
exist before; something that is brought into existence for the first time; is
fresh; and not previously known. Similarly, the word “novel” (1475),
from the French nouveau and Latin novellum, refers to something that
is fresh, or of recent origin, of a new kind or nature that is hitherto
unknown. Finally, the word “revolutionary,” from Old French and late
Middle English (1450), refers to an instance of great change in a
particular thing that is rare; an overthrow of the established way of
doing things.
The definition for each of these words is internally consistent and
contains both qualitative and quantitative aspects that may be relevant
to interpretation of the NOC Regulations. The former refers to the
notion that an innovative product (to use the current vernacular) is one
that has not appeared before its introduction into the marketplace in
any meaningful manner; while the latter may be taken to imply that the
product is not only the first of its kind in existence but represents a truly
revolutionary product rather than an incremental advance over existing
products.

93. Both the Canadian Medical Association and the Consumers Association of Canada
in their evidence before the Parliamentary Committee on Bill C-91 requested that
government take an evidence-based approach to research and development, and noted that
no attempt was made by the government in the lead-up to Bill C-91 to empirically or
objectively assess the potential impact of patent reforms on the costs and benefits to federal
or provincial public health systems. See supra notes 5 and 55, for comments by the Minister
of Consumer and Corporate Affairs that at the time Bills C-22 and C-91 were being
implemented, suggest Parliament did know that it was possible to measure innovation and
construct a national pharmaceutical policy with balanced incentives and rewards, deciding
instead the preferable route was to eschew this approach in favor of a system with neither
output metrics nor proportionality. Jordan, supra note 3; Harrison, supra note 4. See
generally Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 34:4
Parliament of Canada, 4:8–10, 4A:18, (Nov. 27, 1992) and id. at 34:5 Parliament of Canada,
5:53 (Nov. 30, 1992).
94. OXFORD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
UNABRIDGED (1958).
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As noted in our Berkeley study, while the plain meaning of the
terms new and innovation are straight forward, published definitions of
what should constitute an innovative drug range considerably based
largely on industry affiliation. At one end, industry supporters argue
96
that a new and innovative drug is one that merely contains a NAS, to
the slightly more stringent requirements of either being directed to First
in Class therapies (irrespective of whether approval is directed to a new
97
or follow-on drug) or to follow-on drugs that nevertheless undergo
98
priority review. However, merely containing a NAS is an insufficient
basis for designating a drug as pioneering or even as strongly innovative.
This is because there is ample room in either definition for minor
changes to previously approved medical ingredients, including salts,
esters, solvates, polymorphs, and enantiomers. A similar conclusion
applies to drugs that are only directed to First in Class therapies, as
these can also be follow-on versions of previously marketed products
containing slightly modified medical ingredients or directed to new uses
within a therapeutic class. Similarly, where priority review need only be
directed to drugs demonstrating moderate clinical improvement over
existing therapies, it is also an insufficient proxy for strong innovation.
The most plausible definition is that a truly new and innovative drug
is one approved via the new drug approval pathway, one that contains a
NAS, one that undergoes some form of priority review, and one that is
99
directed to a First in Class therapy. Only in combination do these
requirements approach a reasonable definition for a truly breakthrough
or pioneering technology that would constitute a new and innovative
drug, such as that contemplated by the NOC Regulations.
The second policy goal underpinning the regulations is to facilitate
the timely entry of generic drugs into the marketplace. The definition
of “timely” (1593), from the Old English adjective tímlíce, is to appear
100
early, soon; quickly; or in good season. Thus, when something appears
in a timely manner it does so at a time that provides the greatest benefit
to those for whom it appears. Given the public health goal of

95. Bouchard 2009, supra note 14, at 1508.
96. J.D. Kleinke, Commentary: Much Ado About a Good Thing, 325 BRIT. MED. J.
1168, 1168 (2002).
97. See COHEN 2005, supra note 22, at 78; U.S. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, PROSPECTUS
FOR NATIONAL KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT, COMMITTEE ON KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT
OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (1996).
98. Bouchard 2009, supra note 14. See, e.g., PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION, supra
note 21.
99. Id.
100. OXFORD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 94.
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facilitating generic entry for cost savings purposes (for individual
consumers and institutional payers), one can reasonably assume the
timeliness of generic entry refers to the earliest possible date of patent
expiry pertaining to a new and innovative drug. This is consistent with
the fact that the enabling section of the NOC Regulations is the
infringement section pertaining to the early working provision. As
noted in the June 17, 2006 RIAS:
On one end of the balance lies subsection 55.2(1) of the Patent
Act, better known as the "early-working" exception. In the
pharmaceutical industry, early-working allows second- and
subsequent-entry drug manufacturers (typically generic drug
companies) to use a patented, innovative drug for the purpose of
101
seeking approval to market a competing version of that drug.
As discussed in more detail below, however, the concept of early
102
103
working did not, and indeed should not, refer to the working of any
patent at any time. It was intended to refer to a specific patent on a
specific drug about to come off patent protection so as to allow generic
firms to prepare for timely market entry. A second element of this
analysis is that a drug referred in Section 55.2(1) is not a new and
innovative drug for the purposes of all time. It is a drug that is new and
innovative at a particular time in history. The moment when this drug is
no longer new or innovative, for example when it becomes the basis of
104
SNDS submissions and follow-on drugs, constitutes the moment in
history when patents are no longer in relation to new and innovative
drugs, and thus, the moment that may reasonably trigger timely generic
entry.
A time-sensitive definition of patent protection for drugs that are
“new and innovative” is consistent with policy debates preceding the
101. 140 C. Gaz. Pt. I, at 1611 n.24 (2006) (emphasis added).
102. During the parliamentary debates leading up to Bill C-91, it was clear that there
would only be a small number of patents, indeed most often a single or main patent, to
contend with in the early working scenario. See generally testimony on this point by the
Director General, Chemical and Bio-Industries Branch, Department of Industry, Science and
Technology, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:8 Parliament of Canada, 8:37 (Dec. 1, 1992) and testimony from Green Shield, id. at 34:7
Parliament of Canada, 7:27 (Dec. 1, 1992).
103. For the reasons why it should not are discussed in the review of the Supreme
Court of Canada’s “patent-specific” analysis, see infra Section IV.D.
104. For example, the conversion from a mesylate to besylate salt form, a dihydrate to
monohydrate crystalline form, a tablet to capsule form, between different stereoisomers or
enantiomeric forms, etc., with little or no change in bioavailability, pharmacokinetics, and
therapeutic benefit.
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coming into force of Hatch-Waxman in the United States. While
acknowledging that multiple patents could be listed on the patent
register, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, to whom the HatchWaxman amendment were referred by Congress, explicitly noted that
the ability of brand firms to delay generic entry should be narrow both
in scope and time; the proper time for generic entry being “the
expiration date of the valid patent covering the original product” and
that “there should be no other direct or indirect method of extending
105
patent term.”
The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom HatchWaxman was also referred, acknowledged that FDA rules restricting
generic entry prior to Hatch-Waxman “had serious anti-competitive
effects” and that the “net result of these rules has been the practical
extension of the monopoly position of the patent holder beyond the
106
The Committee on the Judiciary went
expiration of the patent.”
further regarding the multiple patent listing issue, stating that it
“accepted the rationale put forward by the Committee on Energy and
Commerce concerning the need to avoid multiple patent term
extensions” to the effect that “the only patented product which
experiences any substantial regulatory delay is the first product patent
(or if there is no product patent, the first process patent).” As a result,
the Committee concluded that any “subsequent patents on approved
drug products are frequently not the same magnitude of innovation as
occurs with respect to the initial patent” and that “on public policy and
health policy grounds that only the first patent on a drug-type product
107
should be extended.” Thus, there is substantial evidence in both
Canada and the United States that the nexus between drug approval
and patents should be narrow, both in scope and time.
In choosing the words “the development of new and innovative
drugs” to be one half of the balance linking patent law to food and drug
law, federal governments in the United States and Canada articulated a
clear public policy goal that pioneering drug development is desired in
exchange for the “unusual protections” afforded to the pharmaceutical
105. House Report No. 98-857, pt. 1 (1984). At 30, the Committee stated: article 1,
section 8, clause 8 of the constitution empowers congress to grant exclusive rights to an
inventor for a limited time. That limited time should be a definite time and, thereafter,
immediate competition should be encouraged. For That reason, Title I of the bill permits the
filing of abbreviated new drug applications before a patent expires and contemplates that the
effective approval Date will be the expiration date of the valid patent covering the original
Product. Other sections of title ii permit the extension of the term of a patent for a definite
time provided certain conditions are met. There should be no other direct or indirect method
of extending patent term.
106. H.R. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4 (1984).
107. Id. at 5–6.
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industry by the linkage regime.
Similarly, in choosing the words
“timely market entry of their lower priced generic competitors” these
109
governments articulated a second public policy goal of cost savings,
triggered by expiry of specific patents on specific drug forms that are no
longer new and innovative.
Based on the forgoing argument, it is reasonable to conclude that
the “balance” sought to be effected by the NOC Regulations between
food and drug law and patent law is not just a qualitative balance
between two poles, but also a quantitative balance. The more reward
there is on the private side of the ledger, the more there must be on the
public side in order to maintain a valid legal equilibrium.
Our data indicate that generic market entry is substantially delayed
by the linkage regime, and that rent-seeking behavior by brand-name
pharmaceutical firms to leverage loopholes in the regime is passed on in
the form of continued monopoly costs to the public. Put another way,
the results of Studies 1, 2, and 3 reveal the fact that not only has the
production of new and innovative drugs declined over the last decade,
but also that the legal protection of drugs under the linkage regime has
conversely increased compared to the protection afforded via
conventional infringement grounds.
The data suggest that there are two components to the
disequilibrium affected by the regulations “in operation.” First, is the
increase in private rewards compared to neutral public value, and
second is the delay in generic entry compared to a neutral private
reward. Of note, the two components combine to produce a larger
disequilibrium than either one alone.
An investigation into the qualitative and quantitative nature of the
balancing of public and private benefits such as that described above is
consistent with the quid pro quo of the traditional patent bargain and
the fact that the enabling statute for the NOC Regulations is the Patent
Act. With this in mind, the following section turns to the Supreme
Court of Canada’s “patent-specific” analysis evidenced in its trilogy of
cases on the NOC Regulations.

108. The Federal Court of Canada, the Federal Court of Appeal, and the Supreme
Court of Canada have repeatedly cited the language of the Supreme Court, which refers to
the NOC Regulations as a “draconian regime” in its first decision on topic. See Merck Frosst
Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Nat’l Health & Welfare), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 193, ¶ 33 (Can.).
109. As noted by the Committee on the Judiciary in its influential report (H.R. Rep.
98-857, pt. 2, at 25 (1984), the public policy grounds achieved through early generic
availability included: reduction of health care costs for the poor, the under-insured, elderly,
and the government as a purchaser of prescription drugs.
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C. “Patent-Specific” Analysis
The qualitative and quantitative interpretation of the original policy
intent advocated above supports a specific reading of the application of
Section 55.2 (infringement) to a narrow range of patents per drug rather
than a general reading that would lay the groundwork for a broad and
potentially indefinite extension of market exclusivity for already
approved pharmaceuticals. The starting point for the analysis is the
enabling statute. As noted by Driedger:
It is not enough to ascertain the meaning of a regulation when
read in light of its own object and the facts surrounding its
making; it is also necessary to read the words conferring the
power in the whole context of the authorizing statute. The intent
of the statute transcends and governs the intent of the
110
regulation.
In its leading decisions on the linkage regime in Biolyse and
111
AstraZeneca, the Supreme Court of Canada narrowly constrained its
analysis on drug submissions and patent listing within the terms of the
Patent Act, expressly stipulating a patent-specific analysis rather than a
broad inclusive analysis of drug submissions and patents supporting
112
market exclusivity under the NOC Regulations. The court held that
while the balance sought is that between food and drug law and
113
regulations and patent law and regulations, the objects of patent
legislation and policy take precedence when interpreting the broad
ambit of the NOC Regulations. When analyzing cases under the NOC
Regulations, courts are required to specifically consider the balance
struck under the Patent Act whereby the public gives an inventor the
right to monopoly protection of their invention in exchange for
110. ELMER A. DRIEDGER, CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 247 (2d ed. 1983). For
discussion of Dredger’s approach to statutory interpretation in the context of NOC
Regulations analysis, see Biolyse Pharma Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., [2005] 1 S.C.R.
533 (Can.); AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 550, ¶
26 (Can.).
111. Biolyse, [2005] 1 S.C.R. at ¶ 26; AstraZeneca, [2006] 2 S.C.R. at ¶ 36.
112. AstraZeneca, [2006] 2 S.C.R. at ¶ 39. A “patent-specific analysis” was recently
confirmed by Health Canada in its 2009 Guidance Document relating to the NOC
Regulations. HEALTH CANADA GUIDANCE, supra note 83, at 26. In addition to
acknowledging that a “patent-specific analysis” is necessary when interpreting the NOC
Regulations, the government further stated that only certain patents are “eligible” for
protection under the NOC Regulations, indicating that not all patents fall within the purview
of the regulations. Id. at 28. See also AstraZeneca, [2006] 2 S.C.R. at ¶ 39; Ferring Inc. v.
Canada (Minister of Health), [2008] 1 F.C.R. 19, ¶¶ 51•57 (Can.).
113. AstraZeneca, [2006] 2 S.C.R. at ¶ 39.
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disclosure of socially valuable information. In Biolyse, the court held
that when contemplating inventions in the field of patented medicines,
we must be mindful of the fact that Parliament was concerned not only
with the balance between inventors and potential users, but also “that
between protection of intellectual property on the one hand and, on the
other hand, the desire to reduce health care costs while being fair to
those whose ingenuity brought the drugs into existence in the first
115
place.”
As a result, claims such as those by Industry Canada, that
poor or otherwise inefficient working of the NOC Regulations resulting
in evergreening of older products can be counter-balanced by the
benefits of a patent regime that gives multi-national firms confidence in
116
Canada, must be tempered by legal assessment of relevant evidence
pertaining to the functioning of the regulations in light of legislative
intent. This latter statement is consistent with amendments to the NOC
Regulations specifically intended to limit evergreening through abuse of
117
the automatic stay provision.
If the public benefits of innovation are raised under the linkage
118
regulations through the terms of the patent bargain, then how much
does one ask for in exchange for the unusual protections of the linkage
regime? The term “patent bargain” is usually used to refer to a grant of
a limited patent monopoly in exchange for public disclosure of socially
119
valuable knowledge. In a public health context, where drug approval
and drug patenting are linked, the essence of the patent bargain may be
viewed as the exchange of extended patent protection for a socially
beneficial level of pharmaceutical innovation that is proportional to the
benefit to firms of extending market exclusivity. Thus, the public
expects, and should expect, something of substantial value in exchange
for extended patent protection and monopoly pricing. In other words,
there should be a strong functional legal nexus between public health

114. Biolyse, [2005] 1 S.C.R. at 533.
115. Biolyse, [2005] 1 S.C.R. at 533, ¶ 2.
116. 142 C. Gaz. 13 Pt. II, 1390, 1593 (2008). This is a similar statement to that found
in all post-2004 RIAS documents that the NOC Regulations provide “stability, predictability
and competitiveness” to Canada’s pharmaceutical patent regime. See generally 138 C. Gaz.
50 Pt. I, 3714 (2004); 140 C. Gaz. 24 Pt. I, 1601 (2006); 142 C. Gaz. 13 Pt. I, 1390, 1588 (2008).
117. See 132 C. Gaz. 11 Pt. I, 553 (1998); 133 C. Gaz. 21 Pt. II, 2355 (1999); 138 C. Gaz.
50 Pt. I, 3714 (2004); 140 C. Gaz. 24 Pt. I, 1601 (2006); 142 C. Gaz. 13 Pt. II, 1390, 1588 (2008).
118. Bouchard 2010, supra note 13.
119. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8 (1966); KSR Int’l v. Teleflex, Inc., 550
U.S. 398 (2007); Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco, Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067 (Can.). For general
discussion, see Ron A. Bouchard, KSR v. Teleflex Part 1: Impact of U.S [sic] Supreme Court
Patent Law on Canadian Intellectual Property and Regulatory Rights Landscape, 15 HEALTH
L.J. 221 (2007) [hereinafter Bouchard KSR Part 1].
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policy and patent policy.
The social benefits of approval-patenting linkage are also implied by
the obligation on courts to carefully scrutinize pharmaceutical patents to
determine if they properly merit the grant of a monopoly privilege in
120
light of the substantial public interest at stake, as well as the
observation that the linkage regulations are deemed to involve “special
enforcement provisions” that operate well beyond the purview of
121
122
traditional patent law. As stated in Whirlpool, the bargain between
patentee and public is in the interest of both sides only where the
patentee receives a monopoly reward that is proportional to what it
discloses to the public; a patentee who evergreens an invention via
successive patents on uninventive additions prolongs its monopoly
beyond what the public has agreed to pay.
Two cases in particular are instructive about how narrow the
functional linkage between the rights of the inventor and those of the
public in the context of the patent bargain should be. In AstraZeneca v.
Canada, the Supreme Court held that the listing provisions of the NOC
Regulations are linked only to a “specific” drug submission rather than
a general submission. The court held that a general listing provision
123
would allow undue evergreening, which would be inconsistent with the
intent of Parliament in enacting the NOC Regulations. A broad
interpretation of the listing provision was seen by the court to
undermine the balance sought by Parliament between the objectives of
124
food and drug law and patent law, with the result that the public
would not derive appropriate benefit from patent legislation—in this
case from properly listed patents. The court stipulated that this scenario
“offends the ‘balance’ inherent to the quid pro quo” in that the
“patentee takes too much in exchange for a weakly innovative
125
invention.”
In other words, the functional legal nexus between patent law and
food and drug law was insufficiently narrow to support the extension of
a patent monopoly on weakly innovative drugs via the linkage regime.
The court also held that ambiguity as to the specific intent of a
120. Farbwerke Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft Vormals Meister Lucius & Bruning v.
Comm’r of Patents [1966] S.C.R. 604 (Can.).
121. 140 C. Gaz. 24 Pt. I, 1598 (2006).
122. Whirlpool, [2000] 2 S.C.R. at ¶ 37 (Can.). See also Free World Trust v. Électro
Santé Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024, ¶ 13 (Can.).
123. AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 550, ¶
23 (Can.).
124. Id. at ¶ 39.
125. Id. at ¶ 39.
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regulation does not have to manifest itself in specific statutory text in
order to be properly considered by the court. Rather, such ambiguity
126
should be analyzed within the entire context of the legislation.
Importantly, the court overruled a general listing requirement
notwithstanding the acceptable industrial strategy of firms to evergreen
products by “adding bells and whistles to a pioneering product even
127
after the original patent for [the] pioneering product has expired.”
This result was based on the finding that an overly broad interpretation
of the NOC Regulations was inconsistent with the narrow terms of
Parliament’s intent in enacting the regulations and offended the quid
pro quo of the traditional patent bargain.
A similar result was obtained in Biolyse v. Bristol-Myers Squibb
(BMS) again using a patent-specific analysis. Here the Supreme Court
dealt with what constituted a brand-name versus a generic “submission”
and, thus, whether a second-entry firm needs to litigate all listed patents
prior to market entry. BMS argued that a drug submission should be
construed broadly to include all submissions, whereas Biolyse argued
that the term should be interpreted narrowly. While the word
“submission” was seen to provide an entry into analysis of statutory
language governing submissions, the court noted that the term
submission was not specifically defined in the regulations. Under the
128
terms of its earlier decision in Bell ExpressVu, the court saw its duty to
consider the entire context of the provision and enabling legislation
before undertaking a specific analysis of the term.
Taking a purposive approach, the court held that the term
submission should be analyzed in its narrow sense rather than a broad
general sense. A general interpretation was seen to lead to the absurd
result whereby a submission by one firm relevant to a medication
encompassed all further submissions relating to that medication, thus
allowing the original patentee to evergreen its product via ever
diminishing minor improvements. This scenario was seen to push the
regulations well beyond its stated purpose, stifle competition and
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, and yield a result at odds
129
with legislative intent. The section was held to be ultra vires based on
breach of the quid pro quo such that the patentee could extend its
monopoly far beyond what its skill and ingenuity contributed to the

126.
127.
128.
129.
(Can.).

Id. at ¶¶ 29–30.
Id. at ¶ 39.
Bell ExpressVu Ltd. v. Rex, [2002] S.C.R. 42, ¶ 10 (Can.).
Biolyse Pharma Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533, ¶¶ 65–67
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public. As with AstraZeneca, the court’s decision was patent-specific
and hinged on a narrow rather than general nexus between drug
approval and drug patenting.
A strong lesson from Biolyse and AstraZeneca is that critical to
analysis of whether pharmaceutical linkage is a success or failure in
achieving its twin policy goals is the long-held exercise in patent
jurisprudence to ensure the patent owner is not getting more of a
monopoly than the public bargained for despite claims of the patentee
130
(and its industry and government supporters) to the contrary.
Innumerable cases have been brought before the courts based more on
imagined, or hypothetical, inventions rather than real ones. When only
patent law is construed, the difference is whether or not the inventions
satisfy the requirements set out in relevant patent legislation. This is
not so with regard to the NOC Regulations, which provide for a specific
legal and functional link among the drug approved, its relevant patents,
and whether they are listed on the patent register. The unique nature of
the interrelationship between the Food and Drug Act, Food and Drugs
Regulations, Patent Act, and Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations was recognized in this regard by the federal
government in its lengthy 2004 RIAS: “Despite their seemingly
competing policy objectives, it is important that neither instrument
[Patent Act, NOC Regulations] be considered in isolation, as the
intended policy can only be achieved when the two operate in a
131
balanced fashion.”
Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, it is plausible to argue that
the interpretation of what constitutes sufficient grounds for the “special
protection” afforded by the NOC Regulations may be seen to differ
from the threshold for patentability per se.
Indeed, the difference between real and imagined inventiveness has
been previously recognized by regulators in the context of the NOC
Regulations and used to negate the protection of the regulations for
inventions where a patentee failed to demonstrate a strong connection
between the invention sought to be protected and the product sought to
132
be approved. This suggests that the concept of early working should
130. Free World Trust v. Électro Santé Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024, ¶ 42 (Can.).
131. 138 C. Gaz. 50 Pt. 1, 3712 (2004).
132. 140 C. Gaz. 24 Pt. 1, 1598, 1611–12 (2006). The government specifically stipulated
that:
[A] temporal connection between the invention sought to be protected and the
product sought to be approved. This ensures that patents for inventions discovered
after the existence of a product do not pre-empt generic competition on that
product. Similarly, the relevance requirement limits the protection of the
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not refer to the working of any patent at any time. Rather, the early
working provision specifically, and hence the empirical outputs of the
linkage regime more generally, should only encompass patents relating
to a specific drug that is new and innovative for the first time in history.
The early working provision should not encompass patents that form
the basis of SNDS submissions and follow-on drugs. Ironically, this
approach was supported by the federal government in its testimony
before the Parliamentary Committee on Bill C-91. That testimony
stated that a new and innovative drug was said to have “[one] main
patent” and “w[h]en that main patent expires, anyone may copy that
133
product and bring it to market.”
As discussed above, a similar
conclusion was reached by both the Committee on Energy and
Commerce and the Committee on the Judiciary at the time the
originating Hatch-Waxman regime came into force.
In light of government reports and jurisprudence on topic, one can
reasonably conclude that the linkage regime was never intended to act
as a vehicle for continuous evergreening of blockbuster products. At
least with regards to Canadian law, pharmaceutical linkage was
intended to provide for international harmonization of Canada’s patent
laws balanced by a narrow (patent-specific) exemption to the
infringement section of the Patent Act in order to allow the early
working of generic drugs prior to expiration of the main patent on a
134
given drug. To paraphrase Justice Binnie in Free World Trust, there is

PM(NOC) Regulations to that which the innovator has invested time and money to
test and have approved for sale. This prevents hypothetical innovation from
impeding generic market entry and encourages innovators to bring their latest
inventions to market. Finally, in only allowing patents to be listed which contain
claims for the medicine or its use, the subject matter requirement makes it clear that
innovations without direct therapeutic application, such as processes or
intermediates, do not merit the special enforcement protection of the PM (NOC)
Regulations.
Id. at 1612–13.
133. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:8 Parliament of Canada, 8:37 (Dec. 1, 1992).
134. Free World Trust v. Électro Santé Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024, ¶ 42 (Can.). The
court states:
The patent system is designed to advance research and development and to
encourage broader economic activity.
Achievement of these objectives is
undermined however if competitors fear to tread in the vicinity of the patent
because its scope lacks a reasonable measure of precision and certainty. A patent of
uncertain scope becomes “a public nuisance” . . . .
R.C.A. Photophone, Ld. v. Gaumont-British Picture Corp. (1936), 53 R.P.C. 167, 195 (Eng.
C.A.).
Potential competitors are deterred from working in areas that are not in fact
covered by the patent even though costly and protracted litigation (which in the case
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a high economic cost attached to taking an overly broad approach to
assessing the nexus between drug approval and drug patenting.
Continuing the analogy, we might also say that it is the proper policy of
patent law to keep the legal nexus between the scope of patent
protection and the scope of innovation narrowly construed rather than
broadly construed, and to assess the integrity of this nexus in light of all
relevant empirical evidence. Otherwise, as at issue in Biolyse and
AstraZeneca, the pharmaceutical linkage regime may stifle innovation,
operate beyond its stated purpose, and yield a result that is at odds with
legislative intent.
D. Statutory Interpretation
The purpose of this Section of the Article is to raise the possibility
that empirical evidence demonstrating that legislation does not achieve
its ends can support the conclusion that the legislation is invalid or in
need of substantial amendment in order for it to remain intra vires. An
ancillary goal is to explore whether there are aspects of statutory
interpretation that illuminate an investigation into whether the NOC
Regulations are meeting the stated goals of stimulating the development
of new and innovative drugs and facilitating timely entry of generic
drugs, and the manner in which this question may be assessed from a
purposive perspective.
According to the principles of purposive analysis as recently
135
reviewed by Hutchinson in the context of intellectual property, the
essence of ordinary language is paramount to the exercise of statutory
interpretation. The ordinary language of a statute or regulation is
informed contextually by the scheme and purpose as well as evidence of
136
137
statutory intent.
Referred to as “external context,” the interface
between original policy intent and the consequences thereof in the real
world informed by the original policy intent refers to “how the

of patent disputes can be very costly and protracted indeed) might confirm that what
the competitors propose to do is entirely lawful. Potential investment is lost or
otherwise directed. Competition is “chilled”. The patent owner is getting more of a
monopoly than the public bargained for. There is a high economic cost attached to
uncertainty and it is the proper policy of patent law to keep it to a minimum.
Id.
135. See generally Cameron Hutchinson, Which Kraft of Statutory Interpretation? A
Supreme Court of Canada Trilogy on Intellectual Property Law, 46 ALBERTA L. REV. 1
(2008).
136. Id. at 7.
137. RUTH SULLIVAN, SULLIVAN AND DRIEDGER ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF
STATUTES 20 (4th ed. 2002).
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legislation works operationally.” As a reminder, the twin policy goals
underpinning the NOC Regulations are to stimulate the development of
new and innovative drugs and to facilitate timely generic entry. In the
present circumstances, the term external context could thus reasonably
be assumed to encompass empirical evidence of the extent and manner
in which the NOC Regulations affect (1) the production of new and
innovative remedies and (2) the timely entry of generic remedies once
the original product patent has expired. Considerations of external
context are those which privilege the setting in which a law operates, i.e.,
empirically, as a response to a set of evolving institutions and
139
relationships.
The construction of law as a dynamic and adaptive (or maladaptive)
system with multiple interconnected and interdependent nodes is
consistent with arguments made on the potential impact of Bill C-91 by
the Canadian Association of Consumers (CAC) discussed in Section
II.A. supra. Of particular relevance, the CAC pointed out that in
exchange for patent reforms including linkage Canada could possibly be
contributing to capital market protectionism by multinational
pharmaceutical firms, a likely preference by firms and regulators for
low-level innovations (Me Too and other follow-on drugs), as well as
minimal positive social welfare outcomes given the preference for
enhanced follow-on innovations. These concerns were echoed in the
testimony of U.S.-based economist Stephen Schondelmeyer who
underscored the potential of pharmaceutical linkage to result in
significantly enhanced market exclusivity periods and cautioned the
Parliamentary Committee to think through the issue of unintended
consequences when constructing a system of innovation where new drug
development and generic entry are fundamentally tied to patents on
older products.
The notion of law as a complex system can also be seen in selected
writings of Fuller and Dworkin to the extent that the purpose, indeed
the validity, of law may be ascertained by the evolving context in which
140
it operates. The notion that law is “alive” rather than stagnant draws
strong parallels to legal and other social sciences scholarship

138. Hutchinson, supra note 135, at 7.
139. Id. at 7–8.
140. Id. at 27 (citing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH
GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 221–30 (2d ed. 2006))
(suggesting that statutes may evolve in ways contrary or against the initial intent, allowing for
an adaptive assessment of the validity of a law against contemporary evidence of its operation
or functioning).
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demonstrating law to be a dynamic complex adaptive system. In such
systems, law-in-operation is strongly contingent on positive and negative
142
feedback loops that impact system performance, including systems of
143
intellectual property law and biomedical innovation.
141. JOHN H. MILLER & SCOTT E. PAGE, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE 9 (2007).
In a complicated world, the various elements that make up the system maintain a
degree of independence from one another. Thus, removing one such element
[which reduces the level of complication] does not fundamentally alter the system’s
behavior apart from that which directly resulted from the piece that was removed.
Complexity arises when the dependencies among the elements become important.
In such a system, removing one such element destroys system behavior to an extent
that goes well beyond what is embodied by the particular element that is removed.
Complexity is a deep property of a system, whereas complication is not.
Id. at 9.
142. Feedback interactions in complex systems have received increased attention in
recent years. See generally ALBERT-LASZLO BARABÁSI, LINKED: HOW EVERYTHING IS
CONNECTED TO EVERYTHING ELSE AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR BUSINESS, SCIENCE, AND
EVERYTHING ELSE (2003) (investigating the role of feedback in biological and social
networks, including corporations and living organisms, producing system fitness); JAMES
GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (1987) (describing order and chaos generally and
how complex systems balance the two through adaptation and positive and negative feedback
loops); JOHN H. HOLLAND, ADAPTATION IN NATURAL AND ARTIFICIAL SYSTEMS (MIT
Press 1992) (1975) [hereinafter HOLLAND 1992] (outlining the importance of adaptive
mechanisms in natural and artificial systems to the growth and destruction of complex
systems); JOHN H. HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: HOW ADAPTATION BUILDS COMPLEXITY
(1995) [hereinafter HOLLAND 1995] (discussing adaptation in complex adaptive systems and
how order and disorder are often balanced at subtle levels in these systems); STEVEN
JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED LIVES OF ANTS, BRAINS, CITIES, AND
SOFTWARE (2001) (discussing the characteristics of emergent systems, including the role of
positive and negative feedback loops in governing de-centralized system growth and
adaptation); STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE: THE SEARCH FOR THE
LAWS OF SELF-ORGANIZATION AND COMPLEXITY (1995) (investigating the conditions that
give rise to the growth and destruction of complex adaptive systems and describing how
optimal complex adaptive systems are balanced on the edge of chaos); GRÉGOIRE NICOLIS &
ILYA PRIGOGINE, EXPLORING COMPLEXITY: AN INTRODUCTION (1989) (addressing the
problem of complexity in using mathematical modeling and the role of essentially irreducible
uncertainty in complex systems); M. MITCHELL WALDROP, COMPLEXITY: THE EMERGING
SCIENCE AT THE EDGE OF ORDER AND CHAOS (1992) (discussing the role of the interrelation and inter-dependence of players, including individuals and institutions, in complex
adaptive systems and showing that systems of this nature are never in stasis, but rather always
continually evolving); Brian W. Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, 262 SCI. AM. 92,
92–99 (1990) (discussing the presence of feedback in producing order and simplicity even in
the most complex economic systems).
143. Bouchard 2009, supra note 14; Ron A. Bouchard, KSR v. Teleflex Part 2: Impact
of U.S [sic] Supreme Court Patent Law on Canadian and Global Systems-Based Innovation
Ecologies, 15 HEALTH L.J. 247, 274 (2007); Ron A. Bouchard, Living Separate and Apart is
Never Easy: Inventive Capacity of the PHOSITA as the Tie that Binds Obviousness and
Inventiveness in Pharmaceutical Litigation, 4 OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 1 (2007) [hereinafter
Bouchard 2007b]; Ron A. Bouchard, Reflections on the Value of Systems Models for
Regulation of Medical Research and Product Development, 17 HEALTH L. REV. 30, 32 (2008).
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Another principle of statutory interpretation that may be
particularly relevant to analysis of the linkage regime is that
interpretation of legislative intent entails an understanding of what
“mischief” the statute or regulation was intended to remedy at the time
144
it was enacted. Review of the matters before the House of Commons
Legislative Committee on Bill C-91 indicate a clear concern with
stimulating the production of globally competitive innovative
pharmaceutical technologies balanced by the cost considerations of
promoting early generic entry. These goals are entirely consistent with
the original policy intent underpinning the regulations enumerated in
RIAS documents, ranging from 1993 to the present, to balance the
production of new and innovative drugs with timely entry of generic
products. Important to the type of balancing function inherent in the
NOC Regulations, Parliament is assumed to avoid promulgating laws
145
and regulations that conflict with one another.
Implicit in both the
purposive and mischief analyses is the recognition of indeterminate
considerations when making law and public policy that cannot be
146
predicted, yet which nevertheless must be accounted for in later
assessments of legislative purpose or effect.
When courts are presented with competing interpretations (i.e.,
general or specific; Patent Act or Food & Drugs Act; health policy v.
industrial policy), the clear choice is one that accords most substantively
with the legislative purpose and one that is consistent with an
147
interpretation of a given statute or regulation as a “workable whole.”
In other words, the law and policy of the legislation or regulation need
to operate consistently with one another from an operational
perspective. As noted by Fuller:
The troublesome cases are in reality resolved not in advance by
the legislator, but at the point of application. This means that in
applying the statute the judge or police sergeant must be guided
not simply by the words but also by some conception of what is
fit and proper to come into the park; conceptions of this sort are
implicit in the practices and attitudes of the society of which he is

144. Hutchinson, supra note 135, at 7–8 (citing RANDAL N. GRAHAM, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 31 (2001)).
145. Hutchinson, supra note 135, at 7.
146. Id. at 21.
147. LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW (1968) [hereinafter ANATOMY]; Lon L.
Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 667
[hereinafter Fidelity]. For a discussion of Fuller’s work in the context of intellectual property
litigation, see Hutchinson, supra note 135, at 22–24.
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a member. . . . All this adds up to the conclusion that an
important part of the statute in question is not made by the
legislator, but grows and develops as an implication of complex
practices and attitudes which may themselves be in a state of
148
development or change.
As implied in the passage from Fuller, the purpose and intent of a
statute or regulation is not static. Rather, it represents a dynamic
process of refining and clarifying means and ends through a system of
149
positive and negative feedback loops. In other words, the intent and
meaning of legislation or regulation is how it operates “in the lives of
people affected by it,” not theoretically or hypothetically as an isolated
idea or even goal. This, importantly, includes objective evidence of the
operation of statutes and regulations such as empirical evidence of
150
contextual operational efficiency.
A final point, which has not escaped the notice of the Supreme
151
152
Court of Canada or the U.S. Federal Circuit, is that courts are not
the only legal authorities deciding whether legislation or regulations are
valid or invalid. When faced with growing evidence of the lack of
success of any legal vehicle, it is the role of the legislature to learn and
dynamically adapt to external signals relating to its original policy
intent, and to decide rationally in an evidence-based manner whether to
abandon either the law or the original policy intent given objective
evidence of how a statute or regulation operates in the ‘real world.’
Where objective empirical evidence such as that reviewed from Studies
1, 2, and 3 shows that the vehicle is operating in contrast to its stated
153
and dynamically interpreted goals, it may be ultra vires or otherwise
154
operating outside of its stated ambit.

148. See ANATOMY, supra note 147, at 59 (emphasis added). As noted by Hutchinson,
“[t]he process of interpreting a statute is not just drawing out what legislators put into it but
adjusting the statute to the implicit demands and values of the society to which it is to be
applied.” See Hutchinson, supra note 135, at 24 n.129. “In this sense it may be said that no
enacted law ever comes from its legislator wholly and fully ‘made.’” Id.
149. Hutchinson, supra note 135, at 23 (referring to Fidelity, supra note 147, at 668.)
150. Hutchinson, supra note 135.
151. Virtually every domestic legal commentator and lawyer writing or litigating this
issue has referenced the Merck court’s description of the NOC Regulations as “draconian.”
See Merck Frosst Canada Inc. v. Canada [1998] 2 S.C.R. 193, ¶ 33 (Can.).
152. Roche Prods. Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
153. Biolyse Pharma Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533 (Can.).
154. AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 550
(Can.).
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E. Revisiting the Empirical Data
In the discussion above, we saw that courts look favorably on
evidence relating to how a statute or regulation operates in the real
world, and that law can be viewed in the context of statutory
interpretation as a dynamic legal construct that may or may not evolve
away from its stated goal or purpose. What, then, is the evidence that
operation of linkage regulations is inconsistent with the intent of the
federal government to encourage the development, or even to simply
protect patents relating to, new and innovative drugs? Indeed, there are
two major sets of observations from our empirical work to suggest that
the operation of the linkage regulations is inconsistent with the goal
underpinning the linkage regime. The first set of observations relates to
drug patenting and the specific levels of innovation supported by these
patents. The second set of observations relates to how, in combination,
drug approval, drug patenting, and the pharmaceutical linkage regime
act in a coordinated manner to increase the effective period of market
exclusivity to the detriment of timely generic entry.
First, we observed a time-dependent decrease in new drug
development over a nearly ten-year period, well after the NOC
Regulations came into force. This was accompanied by a concomitant
increase, in some cases non-linear, in the development of follow-on
drugs. The data reviewed above indicate that these trends have
occurred seemingly independently of strong time-dependent trends in
drug patenting, patent listing, and in drug approvals, consistent with the
principles of emerging lifecycle regulatory models of drug regulation.
The results demonstrate that pharmaceutical firms, when they so desire,
are capable of responding rapidly and strongly to regulatory incentives
in the context of drug regulation, but that this responsiveness has not
extended to increasing the production of new and innovative drugs. An
additional observation is that when drug approval data are analyzed
cumulatively, there is a vanishingly small fraction (1.87%) of brandname drugs that are truly “new and innovative.” It is difficult to believe
that when Parliament stipulated that only patents on new and
innovative drugs were to be protected via the new pharmaceutical
linkage law it had this low level of innovation in mind. Here, it is
important to bear in mind that, unlike other industries, incremental
innovations that have little or no therapeutic value to individual patients
may nevertheless be used as tools to extend the market exclusivity for
blockbuster drugs with broad social value that would otherwise come off
patent.
The second primary finding of our work is that operation of the
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NOC Regulations increases the effective period of patent protection by
at least two-fold beyond the normal period. As such, the evidence
suggests that the linkage regulations are being used as more of a sword
than a shield by pharmaceutical firms. The degree of protection offered
is indiscriminate, and is not specific to high value inventions. Indeed,
the observation in both the U.S. and Canada that up to 75% of listed
155
patents are invalid when litigated on the merits
supports the
conclusion that the functional nexus between drug approval and drug
patenting need only be very weak (i.e., general) to support a significant
extension of the patent monopoly for drugs coming off patent
protection under the NOC Regulations. This scenario is worsened by a
156
weak relevance standard for patent listing, particularly one that
permits listing of multiple patents on follow-on drugs with little change
in benefit:risk. Thus, not only has the linkage regime not resulted in the
development of new and innovative drugs, it has also failed to stimulate
the “timely market entry of generic drugs.” Therefore, both limbs of
the balance inherent in the original policy intent underpinning the
linkage regime are offended.
Supporting the conclusion above is the finding that patenting of
drugs by pharmaceutical firms has escalated substantially since the
coming into force of the NOC Regulations, providing increasing fodder
for the patent listing and automatic stay mechanisms under the
regulations. Related to this is the finding that cumulative patenting and
patent listing have converged strongly over time, and that the delay
between drug approval and patent listing has declined to the point that
the patent listing now seems a better proxy of drug development in
Canada than patenting per se. Trends in new and follow-on drugs were
not altered by the increasing application of the principles of lifecycle
regulation, which, like the NOC Regulations, is also strongly premised
on the production of new and innovative drug products in exchange for
157
strong intellectual property and regulatory rights.
Thus, in the
155. EDWARD HORE, PATENTLY ABSURD: EVERGREENING OF PHARMACEUTICAL
PATENT PROTECTION UNDER THE PATENTED MEDICINES (NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE)
REGULATIONS
OF
CANADA’S
PATENT
ACT
(2004),
http://www.canadiangenerics.ca/en/news/docs/patently_absurd_04.pdf; Andrew A. Caffrey,
III & Jonathan M. Rotter, Consumer Protection, Patents and Procedure: Generic Drug
Market Entry and the Need to Reform the Hatch-Waxman Act, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 13, ¶ 27
(2004); Edward Hore, A Comparison of U.S. and Canadian Laws as They Affect Generic
Pharmaceutical Entry, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 373 (1999–2000).
156. 142 C. Gaz. 13 Pt. II, 1390 (2008) (clarifying judicial rulings on topic in 2006 by the
Supreme Court of Canada in AstraZeneca and the Federal Court of Appeal in Wyeth
Canada. v. ratiopharm, inc., [2008] 1 F.C.R. 447 (Can.)).
157. Ron A. Bouchard & Monika Sawicka, The Mud and the Blood and the Beer:
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absence of a reward system that is proportional to the degree of
innovation, lifecycle-based drug regulation is not likely to alter the
profile of domestic drug development.
Findings from empirical studies such as those in Studies 1, 2, and 3
support the conclusion that the patterns for new and follow-on drugs
may not be reflective, as claimed by industry and its supporters, of low
hanging fruit already being picked, or escalating costs of drug
development. This does not mean that a significant fraction of the lowhanging fruit has not been picked or that drug development has not
become more expensive over time. Rather, results demonstrating a
time-gated and increasing focus by firms on follow-on drug
development, and on broadening the scope and number of patents,
patent type classifications, and therapeutic classifications supporting
them, suggest that firms may be aiming ex ante at discrete legal targets
provided for by law. In the absence of demonstrable intent by
government otherwise, this would be of no concern. However, in both
the United States and Canada, federal governments have in fact stated
that the twin goals of pharmaceutical linkage are to provide strong
patent protection for new and innovative drugs while also facilitating
rapid generic entry, and that these goals are to be achieved in the form
of a specific legal nexus between drug approval and drug patenting
informed by legal and policy grounds underpinning the legislation.
Contrary to the original policy behind the NOC Regulations, brandname firms appear to have decreased their innovative output following
the coming into force of the linkage regime while at the same time
engaging in increased evergreening of already appropriated
technologies using the linkage regulations as the preferred vehicle for
patent extension. The empirical data show that, at best, the linkage
between patent law and food and drug law is general rather than specific
in nature. This is indicative of a weak legal and functional nexus
between the scope of innovation and scope of patent protection; thus,
raising the possibility that the NOC Regulations might, in principle,
infringe the quid pro quo of the patent bargain and produce a result that
is at odds with legislative intent.
Based on the data presented thus far, one can argue that both ends
of the balancing function of the linkage regime (stimulating new and
innovative drug development and facilitating timely entry of generic
drugs) are operating poorly or at least very inefficiently. On the one
hand, generic competition is being stifled owing to a two-fold increase in
Canada’s Progressive Licensing Framework for Drug Approval, 3 MCGILL J.L. & HEALTH
49, 51 (2009).
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the term of patent protection under the regulations on patents that are
weakly relevant to the reference product and that are often invalid
when litigated on the merits. On the other, strong intellectual property
protection is consistently and increasingly being afforded under the
regulations for patents that are not in relation to new and innovative
drugs, including those with a paradoxical approval-patent linkage. As
suggested earlier, this suggests that there are two components to the
disequilibrium affected by the regulations “in operation.” First, is the
increase in private rewards compared to neutral public value, and
second is the delay in generic entry compared to a neutral private
reward.
The two components combine to produce a larger
disequilibrium than either one alone.
An observation that remains politically charged to this day, for
jurisdictions with pharmaceutical linkage or those contemplating
bringing into force some form of linkage, is that drug development by
domestic firms over the last decade has been strongly focused on
technology appropriation. This is somewhat ironic, as one of the major
concerns of policy-makers in the early stages of development of the
NOC Regulations was to “thwart” appropriation by generic drug
companies of innovative technologies propagated by brand-name drug
158
companies, typically articulated as “rights piracy.” As discussed
above, the term “appropriation” is usually used to refer to a party’s
ability to capture profits generated from their own inventions or related
inventions.
The data in Studies 1, 2, and 3 indicate that not only are generic
firms not unduly appropriating innovative technologies, but even if
obtaining an NOC based on bioequivalence grounds could be construed
as appropriation, generic firms are only following the lead of brandname firms who are themselves focusing on follow-on approvals while at
the same time decreasing new drug development activities. This led us
159
to conclude in our McGill study
that the domestic limbs of
multinational pharmaceutical companies are “doing more with less.” As
such, not just brand-name firms, but all forms of domestic
pharmaceutical companies we studied over the course of nearly a
decade are focusing a progressively greater share of their patenting and
regulatory approval energy on appropriating, or extending the value, of
existing technologies over time, presumably relying on the acquisition of

158. Biolyse Pharma Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533, ¶ 45
(Can.) (citing Apotex Inc. v. Canada, [1994] 1 F.C. 742 (Can.), aff’d [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1100
(Can.)).
159. See generally Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 11.
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pioneering biotechnology firms as their technologies crystallize through
clinical trials.
Finally, the results reviewed in this Article have some important
implications for innovation theory in general, which holds that follow-on
or incremental innovation is equally important to overall domestic
productivity and prosperity as pioneering innovation. However, unlike
other industries, follow-on innovations in the pharmaceutical sector
often have little or no therapeutic benefit for the population at large
compared to existing drug products. While this is obviously not true for
all follow-on drugs, when the system is effectively gamed, the multiple
patent listing provision in combination with weak evidentiary
requirements for new and follow-on drug approval can be used to
powerfully extend market exclusivity for blockbuster drugs in a manner
that impacts drug pricing for both public and private payers. Patents on
products within a cluster can be used for this purpose either by
providing the basis for follow-on drug submissions or by providing a
large pool for patenting listing purposes. In either case, breakthrough
innovation is diminished at the same time as the timely entry of generic
products is delayed. Thus, as noted supra, the social consequences of a
regulatory preference for follow-on drugs may be much greater in the
public health sector than other sectors of the economy.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR PHARMACEUTICAL LAW AND POLICY
A. Theory of Linkage-Based Drug Development
The data, law and policy reviewed in this Article demonstrate that
pharmaceutical linkage creates a specific and empirically observable
legal nexus between drug approval, drug patents, and patent litigation.
This nexus can profoundly shape market entry for brand-name and
generic drugs, and thus access to essential medications.
Our work thus far suggests that the scope of this legal nexus depends
on at least four discrete mechanisms provided for by law: (1) the type of
drug submission; (2) the type of drug patent; (3) the legal standard for
patent listing; and (4) how many patents are listed on the patent
register. As such, the nexus can be broad (weak) or narrow (specific).
The lower the evidentiary standard for new or follow-on drug approval,
the easier patents are to come by, the easier it is to list patents on the
patent register, and the more patents that can be listed on the patent
register, the weaker the legal nexus between approval and patenting.
The discrete legal mechanisms underpinning the linkage regime as
they operate in tandem with the evidentiary requirements for drug
approval appear to provide an excellent vehicle for the development of
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valuable to develop a working model of innovation that would identify
functional linkages between different drugs, patents, and listed patents,
and how these linkages combine (and re-combine) over time to delay
generic entry. The goal of work underway by our group, parallel to
three-dimensional models of protein folding, is to convert data such as
that shown in Figs. 1 and 7 into a series of 3-D models that will allow
politicians, law-makers, the judiciary, and scholars to track the evolution
of clusters over time, both with regard to their structure and function.
In this manner, rotational 3-D cluster models would enable visual and
numerical quantification of the impact of clustering on generic entry in
the same manner that one might look at a car from behind (highlighting
the “gas tank,” or original drug product and associated patent tandems)
as well as from the side (from the rear to the front of the vehicle,
underscoring how and when approvals, patents, and listed patents
increase over time with market and regulator vetting).
In a best case scenario, data such as these could be paired with
objective evidence of the level of innovation and therapeutic benefit
associated with various follow-on drugs in the cluster, allowing for
weighted algorithms to be created for pricing and reimbursement
purposes. Such algorithms may also provide an evidence-based
empirical indicator of the need by governments to fund high-risk
research and development activities by pharmaceutical companies.
Product clusters may have particular relevance for loopholes within
the linkage regime that allow for what we referred to in our
Northwestern study as a “paradoxical approval-patent linkage.” The
paradoxical nature of the drug approval-drug patenting nexus refers to
the situation where multiple line extensions occur within a cluster that
in turn are allowed, via the multiple patent listing provision, to extend
market exclusivity on the original new drug form, but also all other
chemically-related drug forms against which they may be listed on the
patent register over time.
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Market Exclusivity
Fig. 8. Paradoxical Drug Approval-Drug Patenting Nexus. Left and right axes represent increases
(profit) and decreases (welfare) in firm profits and public welfare resulting from an increase in
market exclusivity associated follow-on drug product clusters as the number of line extensions and
cumulative patent protection for the product cluster increase. Both profit and public welfare are
assumed for the sake of simplicity to change linearly from the origin. The upward arrow represents
profit whereas the downward arrow represents public welfare. The graph indicates that increases
in the duration of market exclusivity (and hence monopoly pricing) on drug clusters with little
public welfare benefit yield an increasingly paradoxical relationship between the scope of patent
protection per cluster and the degree of social benefit associated with that protection.

As illustrated in Fig. 8, as the number of follow-on drugs in the
cluster grows over time so too does cumulative market exclusivity and
firm profit.
The maximum point of inefficiency (or the most
‘paradoxical’ drug approval-drug patenting nexus) occurs when the
product cluster has a very long duration of cumulative market
exclusivity with little or no therapeutic benefit to the larger population
compared with the original pioneering drug on which the cluster is
based. Given that empirical data are only beginning to be reported, this
clustering effect may present a more substantial barrier to generic entry
than previously recognized, and it is not clear whether generics are
being adequately compensated for taking on the risk of litigation.
A critical element of empirical work done by us and/or other groups
going forward should be to assess clustering data before and after
critical amendments to linkage laws, such as those aimed at reducing the
automatic stay from many to one per reference product and narrowing
the scope of listable patents from those generally on a marketed drug to
those only relevant to the specific drug submission against which they
are listed.
B. Globalization of Pharmaceutical Linkage
As discussed at the beginning of the Article, prompt and affordable
access to essential medicines is a significant component of most
domestic and global models of public health. The availability and costs
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of new and generic drugs is a function of traditional patent law
160
Patent law is a well
incentives and emerging linkage regulations.
161
162
described,
if controversial,
“policy lever” for stimulating the
163
As discussed throughout this Article,
development of new drugs.
linkage regulations tie generic drug availability to existing drug patents
by connecting approval to the resolution of patent validity or
164
165
infringement, potentially resulting in long and costly litigation.
166
While the patent system has been in operation for about 500 years, the
linkage regime has only been in existence for about 25 years following
167
passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act in the United States in 1984 and
160. For an account of the relationship between patents and drug discovery,
development, and marketing from the earliest days of the industry to the present, see
generally GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE LIFE SCIENCE
INDUSTRIES: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (2d ed. 2009).
161. See generally BENGT DOMEIJ, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS IN EUROPE (2000);
Bengt Domeij, Initial and Follow-on Pharmaceutical Inventions in Europe, in ECONOMICS,
LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 177•98 (2003). See also Kenneth Arrow, Economic
Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609•26 (1962); INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: CRITICAL
CONCEPTS IN LAW (2006); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89
Va. L. Rev. 1575 (2003); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics
of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990).
162. See generally KRIMSKY, supra note 8; BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 9; Jaffe,
supra note 10; Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 10; ANGELL, supra note 7; Kevin Outterson,
Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International Prescription
Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. AND ETHICS 193 (2005); Michele Boldrin &
David K. Levine, The Economics of Ideas and Intellectual Property STAFF REPORT 357
(Federal Reserve Bank Of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, M.N.) Feb. 2005, at 102 [hereinafter
Economics of Ideas]; Keith Pavitt, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America National Policies for Technical Change: Where are the Increasing
Returns to Economic Research?, 93 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 126 (1996).
163. Ron A. Bouchard, Should Scientific Research in the Lead-Up to Invention Vitiate
Obviousness Under the Patented Medicines (Notice Of Compliance) Regulations: To Test or
Not to Test?, 6 CAN. J.L. & TECH. 1, 1–27 (2007) [hereinafter Bouchard 2007a]; Bouchard
2007b, supra note 143; Bouchard KSR Part 1, supra note 119, at 222–46; Thomas Faunce &
Joel Lexchin, ‘Linkage’ Pharmaceutical Evergreening in Canada and Australia, 4 AUSTL. AND
N.Z. HEALTH POL’Y 1, 8 (2007); Paul Jones, KSR and the Supreme Court: The Silence is
Deafening, 53 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 849 (2008).
164. For a review of Canadian linkage regulations, see infra part I. See also Bouchard
2010, supra note 13, at 174–227; Bouchard 2009, supra note 14; Monica Sawicka & Ron A.
Bouchard, Empirical Analysis of Canadian Drug Approval Data 2001–2008: Are
Pharmaceutical Players “Doing More with Less”?, 3 MCGILL J.L. & HEALTH 85, 109 (2009);
Joel Lexchin, After Compulsory Licensing: Coming Issues in Canadian Pharmaceutical Policy
and Politics 40 HEALTH POL’Y 69 (1997).
165. Economics of Ideas, supra note 162.
166. Jean O. Lanjouw & William Jack., Brief, Trading Up: How Much Should Poor
Countries Pay to Support Pharmaceutical Innovation?, 4 Ctr. for Global Dev. 1, 1–8 (2004).
167. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(A) (2006) (establishing a list of “Approved Drug Products
with Therapeutic Equivalence” commonly known as the “Orange Book”). For a description
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the Canadian NOC Regulations in 1993. Importantly, the objective of
linkage in both originating jurisdictions was to balance the competing
policy goals of stimulating the development of new and innovative drugs
169
and the timely entry of generic drugs.
Compared to the patent system, the linkage regime thus represents a
novel and emerging intellectual property paradigm for protecting
pharmaceutical inventions. Even so, by 2010, we are witnessing the
rapid spread of the linkage regime on a global level, due largely to a
growing number of multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements with
170
the U.S. These agreements often require participating nations to
incorporate linkage and other intellectual property provisions in
171
exchange for preferential trade terms. As many such agreements are
negotiated outside the purview of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and provide stronger intellectual property protection for drugs
172
than does TRIPS, they are often referred to as “TRIPS-Plus”.
Suggestive of the strength of the multinational pharmaceutical lobby,
the European Commission (E.C.) has recently reported numerous
instances where member nations have attempted to institute
pharmaceutical linkage regimes even though E.U. law prohibits this

of U.S. linkage laws, see Gerald Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its
Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187–94 (1999); Caffrey &
Rotter, supra, note 155, at 4–7; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents, Product Exclusivity, and
Information Dissemination: How Law Directs Biopharmaceutical Research and Development,
72 Fordham L. Rev. 477, 483 (2003); Jeremy Bulow, The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents,
in 4 INNOVATION POL’Y AND THE ECONOMY: NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. (2004);
Epstein & Kuhlik, supra note 90; Mathew Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman
Act by Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS
L.J. 171 (2008–2009).
168. Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations SOR/1993-133 (Can.).
For early descriptions of Canadian linkage law, see, e.g., Tancer, supra note 4; Harrison, supra
note 4; Hore, supra note 155.
169. Avery, supra note 167; Bouchard 2010, supra note 13.
170. Carlos María Correa, Implications of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements on Access
to Medicines, 84 BULL. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. 399–404 (2006); Judit Rius Sanjuan,
Patent-Registration Linkage, DISCUSSION PAPER – NO. 2 (Consumer Project on Tech.), Apr.
3, 2006, at 1, http://www.cptech.org/publications/CPTechDPNo2Linkage.pdf; Overview on
Patent Linkage, CONSULTING REPORT, (Finston Consulting, LLC, Washington D.C.) Aug. 7,
2006, at 1, available at, http://www.finstonconsulting.com/version03/files/Overview.pdf (UK
Consulting Report).
171. Tomas Alured Faunce, Global Intellectual Property Protection for Innovative
Pharmaceuticals: Challenges for Bioethics and Health Law, in GLOBALISATION AND HEALTH
87–108 (2006); Tomas Alured Faunce & Kathy Shats, 62 Bilateral Trade Agreements as
Drivers of National and Transnational Benefit From Health Technology Policy: Implications
of Recent US Deals for Australian Negotiations with China and India, AUSTL. J. OF INT’L AFF.
196–213 (2008).
172. Correa, supra note 170, at 401.
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form of intellectual property law.
The implications of pharmaceutical linkage for global public health
are immense. As reviewed in Section I above, there is growing
empirical evidence to suggest that pharmaceutical linkage can
174
substantially extend cumulative patent terms for high value drugs.
These results are consistent with early predictions of the impact of
175
linkage regulations by Schondelmeyer, based on his work with the
176
originating U.S. regime. An additional concern is that the extension
of market exclusivity on brand-name drugs occurs even though up to
75% of the patents challenged on the merits may be invalid or not
177
infringed by the generic equivalent. Pharmaceutical linkage creates a
conflicting system where governments with linkage regimes that limit
the timely appearance of generics also depend on these firms to produce
178
cost savings and limit the growth in pharmaceutical expenditures. A
related issue is that costs of prolonged litigation are known to be passed
173. European Comm’n Pharm. Sector Inquiry, FINAL REP. (EC) July 8, 2009, at 23
[hereinafter FINAL REP.]. This theme is developed extensively in the European Commission
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Preliminary Report. See European Comm’n Pharm Sector
Inquiry., PRELIMINARY REP. (EPO). OCT. 3, 2008, at 14, 113 [hereinafter PRELIMINARY
REP.].
174. Bouchard 2009, supra note 14.
175. Dr. Stephen Schondelmeyer, a pharmacologist and health economist, gave
evidence before the House of Commons to the effect that it is not the term of single patents
that mattered most, but rather how patents add cumulatively to extend market exclusivity, a
claim the government at the time vigorously denied. Compare testimony of Dr. Stephen
Schondelmeyer (Professor, University of Minnesota) and Dr. Elizabeth Dickson (Director
General, Chemical and Bio-Industries Branch, Department of Industry, Science and
Technology). Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91,
34:7 Parliament of Canada, 7:65–7:96 (Dec. 1, 1992); id. at 34:8 Parliament of Canada, 8:37–
8:40 (Dec. 1, 1992).
176. Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property Rights: Has the
Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 Idea 227, 233 n.27 (2001) (citing The Gale
Group, Intellectual Property Rules: A Delicate Balancing Act for Drug Development, 23
CHAIN DRUG REV., RX13 (2001)).
177. Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration, FTC STUDY (Fed. Trade
Comm’n), July 2002, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf, [hereinafter F.T.C.
Study 2002]. See Hore, supra note 155; Caffrey & Rotter, supra note 155, at 40 n.293. It
should be noted, however, that these data are now somewhat old, and require updating in
both the United States and Canada following amendments to the respective linkage regimes
over the last half decade.
178. PRELIMINARY REP., supra note 173, at 314. The European Commission states:
Originator companies may also litigate against pricing and reimbursement bodies,
claiming patent infringement, irregularities in the generic registration file or
concerns about bioequivalence or non-compliance of the promotional material.
However, as described in Chapter C.2.5., when the interventions before the
marketing authorisation [sic] authorities lead to litigation, originator companies lose
most of the cases, which suggest that the arguments submitted against the generic
product could not be substantiated.
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on to consumers, with differential costs to governments and the public
180
in accordance with their system of drug reimbursement, public
181
182
183
health, public-private discourse, and health equity.
Considerations such as the forgoing must, of course, be balanced
against the widely accepted need for innovative drugs in developed and
developing nations, the presumption favoring the validity of patents in
184
most developed nations, as well as, the notion in law that if the state
grants a party an exclusive right, it cannot grant another party
permission to invade that right without just cause. For this reason the
twin policy goals underpinning linkage are said to be “competing” in
nature.
In addition to shaping the marketplace for brand-name and generic
drugs, intellectual property protection for pharmaceuticals, including
linkage, has become a controversial cog in the global machine of
providing individuals with essential medications, including in
185
186
developed and developing nations. Canada, like many developed
179. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 9; Bulow, supra note 167.
180. EXPLORING SOCIAL INSURANCE: CAN A DOSE OF EUROPE CURE CANADIAN
HEALTH CARE FINANCE? (Colleen Flood, Mark Stabile & Carolyn Tuohy, eds., 2008);
CANADIAN HEALTH LAW AND POLICY, (Colleen Flood, Mark Stabile & Carolyn Tuohy,
eds., 3d ed. 2007); JUST MEDICARE: WHAT’S IN, WHAT’S OUT, HOW WE DECIDE (Colleen
Flood, ed. 2006); ACCESS TO CARE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: THE LEGAL DEBATE OVER
PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE IN CANADA (Colleen Flood, Kent Roach & Lorne Sossin,
eds. 2005).
181. HILTS, supra note 7; AVORN, supra note 7; ANGELL, supra note 7; COHEN, supra
note 7; RAY MOYNIHAN & ALAN CASSELS, SELLING SICKNESS: HOW THE WORLD’S
BIGGEST PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES ARE TURNING US ALL INTO PATIENTS (2005).
182. Mary E. Wiktorowicz, Emergent Patterns in the Regulation of Pharmaceuticals:
Institutions and Interests in the United States, Canada, Britain, and France, 28 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 615, 620 (2003).
183. See Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy, REP. (World
Health Org.), 2006; Eric Noehrenberg, Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property
Rights, Innovation and Public Health: An Industry Perspective, 84 BULL. OF THE WORLD
HEALTH ORG., May 2006, at 419; Emmanuel Hassan, Ohid Yaqub, & Stephanie Diepeveen,
Intellectual Property and Developing Countries, RAND CORP. (2010); Kevin Outterson, Should
Access to Medicines and TRIPS Flexibilities Be Limited to Specific Diseases?, 34 Am. J.L. &
Med. 279, 279-301 (2008). See generally Trudo Lemmens, Leopards in the Temple: Restoring
Scientific Integrity to the Commercialized Research Scene, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 641 (2004);
Trudo Lemmens, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Secrecy about Clinical Trials, HASTINGS CTR.
REP., (2004) 14; E. Richard Gold, The Reach of Patent Law and Institutional Competence, 1
OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 263 (2004).
184. For a critique of the presumption of validity in patent law, see Mark A. Lemley &
Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45
(2007).
185. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jeffery Avorn, Biomedical Patents and the Public’s
Health: Is There a Role for Eminent Domain?, 295 JAMA 434, 434–37 (2006).
186. Public Health: Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights, REP. OF THE COMM’N
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nations, has attempted to play a key role in the global effort to provide
underserved populations with essential medications through its Access
187
188
to Medicines Regime,
but with less success than anticipated.
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, up to this point effort has
189
been focused primarily on the limits of traditional patent law, with
emerging forms of patent and other regulatory protection receiving
considerably less attention.
A related observation is that while the concept of pharmaceutical
linkage is relatively new compared to the patent system, there is already
significant pressure to broaden it beyond drug approval to include
linkage between patent rights and other regulatory aspects of drug
190
approval and marketing.
One of the major implications of the empirical research reviewed
from Studies 1, 2, and 3 is that inclusion of linkage in a nation’s basket
of international trade obligations may present a more expansive notion
of patent protection for drug products than previously recognized,
particularly when gauged against the relatively narrow nexus originally
envisaged between drug patents and the marketed products against
191
which they are listed.
For example, the E.C. Pharmaceutical Sector
192
Inquiry has articulated a broad definition of pharmaceutical linkage,
ON INTELL.

PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUB. HEALTH (World Health Org., Geneva,
Switzerland), April 25, 2006; Graham Dutfield, Delivering Drugs to the Poor: Will the TRIPS
Amendment Help?, 34 AM. J. L. & MED. 107–24 (2008); Aaron Kesselheim, Think Globally,
Prescribe Locally: How Rational Pharmaceutical Policy in the U.S. Can Improve Global
Access to Essential Medicines, 34 AM. J. L. & MED. 125, 125-139 (2008).
187. Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime was established by the Government of
Canada. It allows Canada to enact compulsory licenses, despite provisions in the Patent Act
to the contrary, to export essential medicines to countries without capacity to manufacture the
same. The popular front for this effort was the 2004 Act to amend the Patent Act and the
Food and Drugs Act, also known as the Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Act. For more
information see CANADA’S ACCESS TO MEDICINES REGIME, http://www.camrrcam.gc.ca/index_e.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).
188. Jillian Clare Kohler et al., Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime: Promise or
Failure of Humanitarian Effort?, 5 HEALTHCARE POL’Y 40, 40–48 (2010).
189. Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal
Governance Approach, 77 Temp. L. Rev. 401, 401–424 (2004); THE POWER OF PILLS:
SOCIAL, ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN DRUG DEVELOPMENT, MARKETING AND PRICING
(Jillian Clare Cohen, Patricia Illingworth & Udo Schulenk eds., 2006).
190. FINAL REP., supra note 173; PRELIMINARY REP., supra note 173.
191. Caffrey & Rotter, supra note 155; Hore, supra note 155; Bouchard 2009, supra
note 14.
192. FINAL REP., supra note 173. In the Executive Summary, the E.C. states that:
The Commission will continue to strictly enforce the applicable Community law
and, for instance, act against patent linkage, as according to Community legislation,
marketing authorisation [sic] bodies cannot take the patent status of the originator
medicine into account when deciding on marketing authorisations [sic] of generic
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including linkage of patent status to the following: formal legal
proceedings between parties, patent settlements, interventions before
national drug regulators regarding market approval, drug pricing, and
193
reimbursement. An evolving landscape such as this raises the question
of whether the pharmaceutical industry is using linkage as an emerging
stepping-stone in its efforts to control the movement of drugs across
international borders. Moreover, a growing number of legal disputes
have been reported whereby countries without linkage regulations have
attempted to import or export drugs where shipments are seized by
other nations alleging that these shipments are in violation of domestic
194
patent laws linked to international trade instruments, such as TRIPS
195
or other FTAs.

medicines.
Id. at 23.
In the 2008 Preliminary Report, the E.C. stated more specifically that patent-linkage is
considered unlawful under Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 and Directive (EC) No 2001/83.
PRELIMINARY REP., supra note 173, at 14. Further elaboration is provided to the effect that:
Patent linkage refers to the practice of linking the granting of MA, the pricing and
reimbursement status or any regulatory approval for a generic medicinal product, to
the status of a patent (application) for the originator reference product. Under EU
law, it is not allowed to link marketing authorisation [sic] to the patent status of the
originator reference product. Article 81 of the Regulation and Article 126 of the
Directive provide that authoriation [sic] to market a medicinal product shall not be
refused, suspended or revoked except on the grounds set out in the Regulation and
the Directive. Since the status of a patent (application) is not included in the
grounds set out in the Regulation and in the Directive, it cannot be used as an
argument for refusing, suspending or revoking MA.
Id. at 113–14.
193. PRELIMINARY REP., supra note 173, at 22–23. The report states:
Interventions before regulatory bodies (marketing authorisation [sic] authorities
and pricing and reimbursement bodies) appear to be a standard tool in originator
companies’ toolbox. Although contacting the health authorities may address
legitimate concerns, it can also be used to delay or block the marketing
authorisation [sic] or the pricing or reimbursement status of the generic product. In
particular, by suggesting that the generic product is less efficient or safe or is not
equivalent, raising patent infringement issues concerning the generic product in
question and alleging that any decision favourable [sic] to the generic company
would make the authorities liable to patent infringement damages (patent linkage),
originator companies gain time and can create delays in granting marketing
approval for the generic product and its entry into the market.
Id. at 314.
194. See NAFTA, supra note 2; TRIPS, supra note 2.
195. For example, a 2008 shipment of the anti-HIV drug Abacavir was confiscated by
Dutch customs authorities. The shipment was from an Indian company bound for Nigeria. It
was paid for by UNITAID, the drug purchase arm of the WHO and was meant to be
distributed by the William J. Clinton Foundation. See, e.g., Posting of GenericIPguy to
Indian Patent Oppositions: Abacavir Hemisulfate - Indian pre grant opposition documents,
http://indianpatentoppositions.blogspot.com/2007/11/abacavir-hemisulfate-indian-pre-
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Owing to the confluence of the events reviewed above over time,
linkage regulations in respect to therapeutic products have quietly
emerged as key driver of public health costs and medical product
regulation on the global stage, both for developed and developing
nations.
The Author is a member of a new global consortium of intellectual
property and health policy scholars, economists, and practicing lawyers
in nine counties (Consortium), who have come together to study global
196
pharmaceutical linkage regulation.
When the Consortium began its work, the obvious question to ask
was—what should the focus be of future research on pharmaceutical
linkage as it evolves globally away from its North American roots? In
197
its work thus far, the Consortium recognizes that the study of
structure-function relationships in living systems, both at the micro and
macro level, has served empirical science especially well over the last
century. Indeed, the rapid spread of pharmaceutical linkage worldwide
offers a unique and time sensitive opportunity to carry out empirical
work on the system as it evolves globally from its point of origin in the
United States. A major goal of our work on global pharmaceutical
linkage will be to investigate the structural and functional aspects of
different systems of linkage regulations in different jurisdictions, and
their relationship on the one hand to drug availability costs, and
expenditures, and incentives for innovation and protection of
intellectual property rights on the other.
Key decision makers, pharmaceutical firms, the courts, patent
counsel, consumers, and other actors are assumed to interact in
grant.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2007, 02:24); EUR-Lex - 32003R1383-EN, http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003R1383:EN:HTML (last visited
Oct. 18, 2010 02:14).
196. The consortium is spread across nations with mature linkage regulations (United
States and Canada), nascent regulations (Australia and China), those without regulations but
with certain practices that may operate to parallel linkage (E.U.), and those where both the
existence and scope of linkage regulations are currently the subject of intense public scrutiny
and litigation (India, Mexico, and South Korea). It includes individuals with past and present
litigation experience with pharmaceutical regulations on both sides of the brand-generic
divide, and includes scholars appointed in faculties of law, medicine, health, and economics as
well as practicing lawyers working in law firms and non-governmental organizations on
pharmaceutical matters. The consortium is fortunate to be supported in its endeavors by a
Key Decision Maker Advisory Board (KDMAB) composed of senior members of government
in health, industry, and intellectual property portfolios and the judiciary working on matters
relating to pharmaceutical linkage regulations.
197. Bouchard, R.A. Cahoy, D., Domeij, B., Dutfield, G., Faunce, T., Hollis, A., Jones,
P., Ali Khader, F., Lexchin, J., Nam, H., & Serrano, J.L. “Global Pharmaceutical Linkage
Regulations: A Consortium Framework.” Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology
12(2): 1-30. 2011.
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domestic and global networks through reasonably well-defined channels
198
As in other complex political and economic
of communication.
199
systems, this network is assumed to have structural and functional
characteristics that can be identified and measured, and which in turn
serve as appropriate benchmarks to assess the performance of the
system relative to its goals and objectives.
The specific basket of legal checks and balances in a given linkage
regime is pivotal, as it determines not only how a complex system of
pharmaceutical regulation begins operating de novo following the
coming into force of law but also, how it evolves over time to yield
demonstrable empirical results. It has been previously shown, for
200
example, that the behavior of dynamic legal systems, including how
201
systems learn, self-regulate, and adapt and grow, is strongly influenced
202
by positive and negative feedback. Positive feedback is feedback that
results in growth or amplification of a particular process or group of
related processes whereas negative feedback results in tamping or
slowing of a particular process or group of processes. Studies of
complex social, biological, and technological systems have shown that
the unintended consequences resulting from feedback has the potential
to force a system away from operating at or near the point of
203
efficiency.
We have used the term “structural” to refer to the broad
administrative, legal, and policy attributes of the linkage regime in
differing jurisdictions as these represent the initial starting conditions
for operation of local linkage regimes. The initial starting conditions, as

198. Drahos, supra note 189.
199. Harrison, supra note 4; JERVIS, supra note 32; Bozeman & Sarewitz, supra note
81; Bozeman, supra note 81; Sterman, supra note 80.
200. Neil E. Harrison, Thinking About the World we Make, in COMPLEXITY IN WORLD
POLITICS: CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF A NEW PARADIGM 1, 10 (Neil E. Harrison ed.,
2006) [hereinafter COMPLEXITY]; JERVIS, supra note 32.
201. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the
Evolution of Law and Society and its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV.
1407 (1996); J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management: Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI.
& TECH. 21 (2005–2006).
202. Feedback interactions in complex systems have received increased attention in
recent years. See generally Barabási, supra note 142; Gleick, supra note 142; Holland 1992,
supra note 142; Holland 1995, supra note 142; Johnson, supra note 142; Kauffman, supra note
142; Nicolis & Prigogine, supra note 142; Waldrop, supra note 142; Arthur, supra note 142, at
92–99.
203. See, e.g., Robert M. May et al., Complex Systems: Ecology for Bankers, 451
NATURE 893 (2008). For a look at the role of feedback in policy failure, see generally JERVIS,
supra note 32; COMPLEXITY, supra note 200; Bozeman, supra note 81; Bozeman & Sarewitz,
supra note 81; and Sterman, supra note 80.
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in dynamical physical systems, represent the sum of the political,
economic, and public policy conditions that together form the “take-off”
point for a new law and the conditions in which it begins to operate.
The structural aspect also encompasses the specific legal mechanisms
that drive operation of linkage regimes in various jurisdictions.
Identifying the structural attributes and mechanisms of individual
linkage systems is important, as they provide the benchmark from which
to assess the successes and failures of each system in operation and their
potential to combine to form a global regulatory regime. By contrast,
we use the term “functional” to refer to the outputs of the regulations in
each jurisdiction as well as how they functionally interact across borders
to operate as a global regulatory regime. The functional aspects of a
system reflect the behavior of the system as it evolves with time away
205
from the initial starting conditions.
A significant advantage of a globally-based Consortium approach to
the study of pharmaceutical linkage is that studying linkage in different
jurisdictions allows for both an investigation of the structural and
functional characteristics of local linkage regimes with different initial
starting conditions and different legal mechanisms of operation, the
identification of general rules of linkage as the different national forms
of linkage interact and influence global pharmaceutical regulation. The
former provides a descriptive mechanism for assessing the successes and
failures of different regimes, while the latter provides a prescriptive
approach for key decision makers to revise, institute, or abolish linkage
regulations according to the goals and objectives of differing nations.
The goal of the Consortium’s future work on global pharmaceutical
linkage is to produce and use empirical knowledge relating to the
structure and function of different linkage regimes as a knowledge
translation tool for assessing the strengths, weaknesses, successes, and
failures of pharmaceutical linkage in individual nations and as they
combine to form a global system of pharmaceutical linkage. A
secondary goal is to directly assist key decision-makers and knowledge
users in domestic and global governments and legal systems working

204. See generally Barabási, supra note 142; Gleick, supra note 142; Holland 1992,
supra note 142; Holland 1995, supra note 142; Johnson, supra note 142; Kauffman, supra note
142; Nicolis & Prigogine, supra note 142; Waldrop, supra note 142; Arthur, supra note 142, at
92–99.
205. COMPLEXITY, supra note 200; JERVIS, supra note 32; see also, Clifford Shearing &
Jennifer Wood, Nodal Governance, Democracy, and the New ‘Denizens,’ 30 J.L. & SOC’Y 400,
401–06; LES JOHNSTON & CLIFFORD SHEARING, GOVERNING SECURITY: EXPLORATIONS
IN POLICING AND JUSTICE ch. 8, 138 (2003); Scott Burris, Governance, Microgovernance and
Health, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 335, 357 (2004); Drahos, supra note 189.
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with linkage regimes in their efforts to stimulate the production of new
and innovative drugs while at the same time lowering public health costs
and increasing access to essential medicines.
SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
Our empirical investigation into the nexus between drug approval,
drug patenting, patent listing, and litigation under the domestic
Canadian linkage regime for pharmaceuticals has yielded a number of
important observations. Primary among these is that the development,
approval, and marketing of new and innovative breakthrough drugs
have stagnated in favor of follow-on drug development. The number of
truly innovative drugs is very low, representing about 1.87% of all
brand-name submissions and 1.23% of total submissions. This trend has
been ongoing for about a decade and appears to have occurred
independent of concomitant changes in firm patenting, patent listing,
and patent litigation. The second primary observation is that operation
of the linkage regime over the same timeframe has resulted in a
doubling of cumulative patent protection for blockbuster drugs, from an
average term of twenty-two years to a term of forty-three years.
Extended patent protection under the NOC Regulations was associated
with a substantial degree of litigation, often resulting in opposing
decisions on validity or infringement at the same level of court. Unlike
the U.S. linkage regime, litigation in Canada is deemed to be judicial
review in nature. Thus generic firms, while successful on issues of
validity or infringement under linkage laws, remain vulnerable to a post
hoc infringement action. There is little question as to whether these
costs are passed on to consumers in the form of monopoly prices.
Together the data show that the production of new and innovative drugs
is low and decreasing over time, domestic pharmaceutical companies are
focused more on appropriating existing technologies than on
breakthrough drug development, and that generic entry on high value
drugs is being increasingly delayed.
The empirical findings reviewed here are at odds with the intent of
the federal government in enacting the NOC Regulations to stimulate
the development of new and innovative drugs and facilitate the timely
entry of generic drugs. Questions as to the validity of the NOC
Regulations arise when a purposive patent-specific approach to
interpreting the NOC Regulations is taken, as stipulated by the
Supreme Court of Canada in its leading patent jurisprudence. Taking
this approach to analysis of the linkage of drug approval and drug
patenting in the specific infringement context of Section 55.2(1) of
Canada’s Patent Act, one could argue that the concept of early working
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does not refer to the working of any patent at any time. As suggested
by testimony by the federal government before the Legislative
Committee on Bill C-91, the early working provision was intended to
refer to a specific patent on a specific drug so as to allow generic firms
to prepare for timely market entry in relation to that drug and that
patent. A second element of a patent-specific analysis is that a drug
referred in Section 55.2(1) is not a new and innovative drug for the
purposes of all time. It is a drug that is new and innovative at a
particular time in history. The moment when this drug is no longer new
or innovative, for example when it becomes the basis of SNDS
submissions and follow-on drugs, constitutes the moment in history
when patents are no longer in relation to new and innovative drugs, and
thus, the moment which may reasonably trigger timely generic entry.
A similar conclusion may be drawn from the legal debate
surrounding the coming into force of the U.S. Hatch-Waxman regime,
particularly with respect to influential reports from the Committee on
Energy and Commerce and the Committee on the Judiciary preceding
the legislation.
Relegating listing only to specific drug submissions considered to be
“new and innovative” based on objective evidence rather than in an
arbitrary manner on all new (NDS) and follow-on (SNDS) submissions,
would be in line with the spirit of the regulations to encourage the
development of new and innovative drugs and to facilitate the timely
entry of generic alternatives. The same is true of the multiple patent
listing model, whereby listings could be pruned by regulators only to the
small number of patents associated with demonstrably new and
innovative drugs. Amendments such as these would accord with the
framework for the linkage regime put forward by the Canadian
government in the lead-up to Bill C-91 as well as reports by the
Committee on Energy and Commerce and the Committee on the
Judiciary in the United States in the lead-up to Hatch Waxman. At the
time both pieces of legislation came into force, U.S. and Canadian
governments strongly asserted that linkage protection was aimed at a
narrow range of patents on new and innovative drugs, and when that
narrow range of patents expire, anyone in a position to copy that
product can legally bring it to market. As discussed above in greater
detail, the language used by both governments is consistent with the
plain meaning of the terms “new and innovative” and “timely.”
In choosing the words “the development of new and innovative
drugs” to be one-half of the balance linking patent law to food and drug
law, federal governments in the United States and Canada articulated a
clear public policy goal that pioneering drug development is desired in

2011]

I’M STILL YOUR BABY

145

exchange for the “unusual protections” afforded to the pharmaceutical
industry by the linkage regime. Similarly, in choosing the words “timely
market entry of their lower priced generic competitors” these
governments articulated a second public policy goal of cost savings,
triggered by expiry of specific patents on specific drug forms that are no
longer new and innovative. Thus the balance sought to be effected by
pharmaceutical linkage is not just a qualitative balance between poles,
but also a quantitative balance. The more reward there is on the private
side of the ledger, the more there must be on the public side in order to
maintain a valid legal equilibrium.
The data in Studies 1, 2, and 3 demonstrate that, when analyzed in
its “real world” context, the Canadian linkage regulations are not
working either as intended by Parliament at the time the law was passed
or in a manner that is consistent with the goals and objectives of the
federal government as articulated in later RIAS documents. Private
firms are obtaining extended patent protection for weakly inventive
products, while at the same time generic competition is markedly
delayed. The result is that pharmaceutical firms are reaping the rewards
of intellectual property protection at historically high levels in this
country while the public (and institutional payers) is being deprived of
reasonably priced pharmaceuticals.
In light of the principle of statutory interpretation that legislation
should be understood and assessed objectively in the setting in which it
operates, it is possible that the operation of the NOC Regulations as
currently constituted breaches the quid pro quo of the traditional patent
bargain from a patent-specific perspective. Based on the same
reasoning and evidence one might conclude that the linkage regime
does not rectify the mischief it was intended to remedy, and thus may
yield a result that is at odds with legislative intent.
Finally, data such as those in Studies 1, 2, and 3 suggest that blending
of industrial and health policy goals may be ineffective and possibly
counterproductive in terms of public health outcomes. Particularly
worrisome is the potential for linkage loopholes permitting a
“paradoxical drug approval-drug patenting nexus,” whereby the largest
degree of market exclusivity is provided on products with the least
amount of innovation. The Article provides a theory of how this may
occur within the context of pharmaceutical linkage, via the development
of “product clusters.”
There is no question that established and emerging drug regulatory
regimes have great potential to increase the efficiency of public health
provision by placing both new and innovative and older blockbuster
remedies in clinical environments sooner. However, a growing body of
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evidence, including data reviewed here, seems to indicate that the
efficacy of this approach can be weakened through inadequate
monitoring and supervision, such that pharmaceutical firms perceive a
higher incentive to exploit existing patented technologies in new ways
rather than increasing the flow of new technologies. At a more general
level, the data lend empirical substance to an emerging consensus that,
in many circumstances, intellectual property rights may be an inhibitor
of innovation in so far as this term is construed to yield the greatest
social benefits for the public.
It is concluded that policy and legislative incentives designed to
stimulate innovation in the pharmaceutical industry have had the
opposite effect, and that shifting to a lifecycle regulatory model is
unlikely to alter this scenario absent effort to balance economic
incentives for breakthrough and follow-on drug development.
Importantly, the findings presented in the Article do not suggest
unusual behavior by pharmaceutical firms. Rather, the data point to the
failure of policy incentives intended to induce the desired result, namely
stimulating the development of new and pioneering drugs while also
facilitating the timely entry of generic drugs and thus access to essential
and affordable medicines.
206
As discussed in greater detail elsewhere, it is possible that
unintended consequences such as those reported here have come about,
at least in part, as a result of the discrete system of legal checks and
balances comprising the domestic linkage regime, particularly when the
balance of “pro-brand” and “pro-generic” provisions in the Canadian
system of linkage are compared to those employed in other
jurisdictions.
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